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Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin have proven to be a phenomenal success. The underlying techniques hold huge promise to change the future of financial transactions, and
eventually the way people and companies compute, collaborate, and interact. At the same
time, the current Bitcoin-like proof-of-work based blockchain systems are facing many
challenges. In more detail, a huge amount of energy/electricity is needed for maintaining
the Bitcoin blockchain. In addition, their security holds if the majority of the computing
power is under the control of honest players. However, this assumption has been seriously
challenged recently and Bitcoin-like systems will fail when this assumption is broken.
This research proposes novel blockchain designs to address the challenges. We
first propose a novel blockchain protocol, called 2-hop blockchain, by combining proofof-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms.

That said, even if the adversary controls

more than 50% computing power, the honest players still have the chance to defend
the blockchain via honest stake. Then we revise and implement the design to obtain a
practical cryptocurrency system called Twinscoin. In more detail, we introduce a new
strategy for difficulty adjustment in the hybrid blockchain and provide an analysis of
ix

it. We also show how to construct a light client for proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies and
evaluate the proposal practically. We implement our new design. Our implementation
uses a recent modular development framework for blockchains, called Scorex. It allows
us to change only certain parts of an application leaving other codebase intact.

x

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Motivation
Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin [Nak08] have proven to be a phenomenal success. The

underlying techniques hold a huge promise to change the future of financial transactions,
and eventually our way of computation and collaboration. At the heart of the Bitcoin
system is a global public distributed ledger, called blockchain, that records transactions
between users in consecutive time windows. The blockchain is maintained by a peerto-peer network of nodes called Bitcoin miners via the so-called proof-of-work (PoW)
mechanism: in each time window, cryptographic puzzles (also called proof-of-work puzzles [DN93; Bac02]) are generated, and all miners are encouraged/incentivized to solve the
puzzles; the first miner who finds a puzzle solution is allowed to extend the blockchain
with a block of transactions, and at the same time he can collect a reward. It is easy to
see that the more computing power a miner invests, the better his chances are at solving
a puzzle first.
Bitcoin is an open system; any player who invests a certain amount of computing
resources is allowed to join the effort of maintaining the blockchain. This unique “easy
to join/leave” feature along with a smart incentive strategy help the system “absorb”1 a
huge amount of computing resources over the past several years. Intuitively, the security
of blockchain is backed up by a significant network of physical computing resources.
This intuition has recently been investigated in academia. For example, Garay et
1

You may say the system consumes/wastes a huge amount of computing resources.

1

al. [GKL15] and then Pass et al. [PSS17a] looked into the “core” of the Bitcoin system, the
Nakamoto consensus protocol; they showed that, assuming the majority of mining power
in the Bitcoin system is controlled by the honest miners, then the Nakamoto consensus
indeed satisfies several important security properties as defined in their cryptographic
models. On the other hand, if this assumption does not hold, then the security of the
Bitcoin system cannot be guaranteed.
This assumption has been seriously challenged: the mining power can be dangerously
distributed in the system. For example, in 2014, the mining pool GHash.io exceeded 50%
of the computational power in Bitcoin [Goo14]. Currently, top mining pools including
F2Pool, AntPool, BTCC and BW, are all in China; they collectively control about 60%
mining power. It is not clear if those mining pools collude. Very recently, one mining
pool has had 50% mining power in Zcash [Tor]. Efforts have been made to address this
crisis. In [Mil+15], novel ideas are introduced to discourage the formation of mining pools.
However, it is not clear in practice how to utilize these ideas to protect the system if the
adversary controls the majority of mining power. We here ask the following question:
Is that possible to strengthen Bitcoin-like system so that it can be secure even
when the adversary controls more than 50% computing power in the system?
1.2

Our Considerations
Before giving a proper solution to the above question, we need to understand

Nakamoto’s design more. Only then, we might be able to mimic Nakamoto’s footprint
and push this line of design further.
Leveraging the power of virtual resources in the system. Ideally, we would like to
construct Bitcoin-like blockchain which is secure against a very strong adversary even
from the beginning. However, it is easy to see that cryptocurrency systems are very frag-

2

ile in their early stage. It will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to “grow” a stable
Bitcoin-like blockchain if the adversary controls the majority of computing power at the
very beginning. In this work, we consider how to make an already mature cryptocurrency system such as the current Bitcoin system to be more robust in the sense that the
system remains stable even the adversary controls the majority of computing power. As
mentioned, Bitcoin already “absorbed” a huge amount of honest computing power; note
that these physical resources have been converted into “virtual resources”, i.e., the coins.
It is fairly reasonable to assume the coins are nicely distributed in the system and most of
them are controlled by honest users. A natural way to go is to use this huge amount of
honest virtual resources as a buffer to defend against the adversary who can dominate the
network of computing power.
The difference between physical resources and virtual resources. It is definitely
desirable to utilize the power of virtual resources to secure a blockchain. If successful, the
new system will be “green” in the sense that it does not require a huge amount of physical
resources, which cannot be recycled, to back up its security. Attempts have been made. For
example, proof-of-stake (PoS) mechanisms have been widely discussed in the cryptocurrency community. In a nutshell, proof-of-stake mechanisms for consensus require protocol players to prove ownership of a certain amount of virtual resources. Only those that
can provide such a proof can participate in maintaining the blockchain. However, it is not
clear how to construct an open blockchain which can scale to a large number of network
nodes (as in Bitcoin), via any proof-of-stake mechanism. At a very intuitive level, virtual
resources, which proof-of-stake mechanisms are based on, are very difficult to manage
in a practical protocol. SS This intuition has been confirmed recently by the concurrent
works of [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17]); there, very interesting and non-trivial attempts have
been made to construct provably secure, scalable blockchains via pure proof-of-stake. Unfortunately, these solutions cannot scale to a large number of network nodes in an open
3

setting where participants can freely join or leave the system any time they want. In more
details, a secure bootstrapping mechanism (i.e., majority voting) is required for ensuring
new participants can securely join the system. However, this “bootstrapping” cannot scale
to a large network. See Section 1.3 (Related Work) for more discussion. In one word, it
seems it is extremely difficult to mimic Nakamoto’s footprint via virtual resources only.
On the other hand, physical resources are relatively easier to manage. Indeed,
Nakamoto demonstrates to us an amazingly practical protocol via the proof-of-work
mechanism to manage physical computing resource effectively. Alternative physical resources such as a publicly available random beacon or secure hardware can also allow us
to construct fast protocols. See Section 1.3 (Related Work) for more discussion about open
blockchain via alternative physical resources.
The practical elegance of using random oracle for cryptocurrency. Although fast
blockchain protocols can be constructed via physical resources such as random beacon or
trusted hardware, there is a significant drawback in these solutions. That is, the trapdoor
information of the system is possessed by a single party. Currently, it is not clear how
to eliminate such trapdoor information. Interestingly, blockchain via the proof-of-work
mechanism can avoid such issue in practice: the underlying proof-of-work puzzles can be
based on hash functions, and the security of the system can be argued in the so-called random oracle model. Theoretical cryptographers may criticize random oracle methodology
since it is not sound [CGH98]. However, random oracles do enable an elegant solution to
open blockchains in practice.2
Additional considerations. There are many reasons that Bitcoin has become a successful system. For example, proof-of-work puzzles Bitcoin is a divisible e-cash system [OO92;
2

We note that Nakamoto’s design is consistent with the folklore wisdom of a “nothing
up my sleeve number” [Wikd] which has been widely used in practical cryptographic
designs.

4

Oka95]. Besides the points we discussed above, to design a practical blockchain, we in general should avoid heavy cryptographic tools, and use only standard cryptographic primitives such as hash functions and digital signature schemes. Futhermore, the design should
be simple. Finally, the provable security approach should be taken to develop blockchain
techniques. We eventually should move these powerful blockchain techniques from an
art to a science.
1.3

Related work

1.3.1

Closely related work on combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake

Proof-of-activity. The idea of combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake has been
studied in [KN12; Cry14; Ben+14], and the latest one, proof-of-activity (PoA) [Ben+14] is
closest to our work. Although these studies showed that their protocols are secure against
some classes of attacks, they do not provide any formal security model and analysis relying
on precise definitions. We note that the earlier proposal [Ben+14] is different from our
result on both security analysis and the construction.
First, the leader election mechanism in PoA design is predictable. More specifically,
miners generate empty block header and then the header will be mapped to N stakeholders, where N ≥ 1 and typically N is set as 3. They use deterministic mapping function
to elect exact N stake holders (see item 3 Figure 2 in [Ben+14]). That said, the adaptive
adversary can easily predict future leaders and corrupt them in advance. As a result, the
protocol will not be secure even if the adversary only controls the minority of stake or
computing power. In contrast, our proposal naturally mimics Nakamoto’s footprint, and
it is the first adaptively secure proof-of-work / proof-of-stake hybrid consensus protocol.
In addition, we note that the PoA proposal in [Ben+14] will not immediately give us
a divisible cryptocurrency [OO92; Oka95] unless extra efforts are paid.

5

Casper. Casper [BG17] is also a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake protocol. Informally, stakeholders can lock their stakes to be validators, and then vote for each block
whose height is an exact multiple of 100 (i.e., checkpoint). However, this voting-based
protocol only scales to a small number of validators. As the result, the protocol will eventually be centralized and the control is in the hand of a small number of participants.
In contrast, our proposal mimics Nakamoto’s footprint so that anyone who has coins
can join the proof-of-stake.

Decred.

Another similar proposal is Decred [Jep15]. This proposal needs an additional

trusted entity to produce tickets for participants. Informally, stakeholders will purchase
tickets and check if their tickets are selected. Then the stakeholder with the selected ticket
is qualified to produce a new block. Note that, he selection process is pseudo-randomized
where the pseudo-randomness is from the proof-of-work chain.
This design is very similar to our proposal in the sense that the pseudo-randomness
for the elections of stakeholders is from the proof-of-work chain. However, no trusted
party is required in our protocol.
1.3.2

Proof-of-stake

Very recently, concurrent works (e.g., [CM17; Kia+17; PS17; DPS17; Dav+17; FZ17;
Gil+17]) have made very interesting attempts to construct provably secure, scalable
blockchains via PoS only. We note that, our work is fundamentally different from these
pure PoS proposals in the following sense: ours is based on the majority of honest collective resources (including both stake and work), while these pure PoS proposals are based
on the honest majority of stake. Combining stake with work will bring us several benefits. For example, in these pure PoS proposals, the stake holders must have their stakes
registered much earlier before participating in the mining process. In addition, some of

6

these PoS protocols may suffer from rational attacks, including nothing at stake attacks
and selfish mining attacks; see [Coh+] for discussions. Our design does not suffer from
these attacks.
We already discussed recent effort on provably secure pure proof-of-stake (PoS) proposals [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17] above. Before these recent rigorous efforts, using virtual
resources (i.e., stake) to construct cryptocurrency has been intensively considered in the
Bitcoin community. In a nutshell, the PoS mechanisms for consensus require a protocols’
players to prove ownership of virtual resources. Only those that can provide such proofs
can participate in maintaining the protocol’s blockchain, their ability to do so is proportional to the stake owned. Since the inception of the idea in an online forum [Bit11], several variants of PoS that have been proposed and implemented in real cryptocurrencies
including [NXT14; Kwo14; Vas14; BGM16; KN12; Cry14]. In general, a PoS proof system simulates random leader election, where each participants’ chance of being elected
is proportional to the amount of stake that they control in the system. The chosen leader
proves that they were elected by providing a cryptographic proof (a digital signature) that
they own a specific share of stake. We note that, these proposals lack of rigorous security
analysis.
1.3.3

Cryptocurrency and security analysis

Anonymous digital currency was introduced by Chaum [Cha82] in the early 1980s.
The first decentralized currency system, Bitcoin [Nak08], was launched about 30 years
later, by incentivizing a set of players to solve moderately-hard cryptographic puzzles
(also called proofs-of-work puzzles [DN93; Bac02]). Recently, the security of Bitcoin system has been analyzed in the rational setting, e.g., [ES14; Eya15; Nay+15; Kia+16; SSZ16;
Sch+16], and also in cryptographic setting [GKL15; PSS17a; SZ15; KP15; KP16]. Several
important security properties, common prefix, chain growth, and chain quality, have been
7

considered for secure blockchain protocols. The common prefix and chain quality properties were originally formalized by Garay et al. [GKL15]. The chain growth property
was first formally defined by Kiayias et al. [KP15]. The common prefix property was later
strengthened by Pass et al. [PSS17a]. In our study, we adopt the stronger variant of the
common prefix property by Pass et al. [PSS17a] together with the chain quality and chain
growth from [KP15; GKL15].
Very recently, Vassilis et al. [Bad+17] propose a simulation-based analysis for Bitcoin protocol. More specifically, they put forth a universally composable treatment of the
Bitcoin protocol, formalizing ledger functionality and leader election (lottery) via proofof-work, and show that the three security properties can be implied by the ledger functionality.
1.3.4

More alternative consensus techniques

Similar to PoW, alternative consensus techniques via different physical resources
have been considered to replace computing power. For example, the physical storage
resource is used in [Par+15; Mil+14; Abu+17]. Between the use of space/memory and the
use of time, are proofs of space time introduced in [MO16]. This is a hybrid proof system
utilizing both computational and space resources. Finally, trusted hardware has been used
for constructing blockchain protocols in [Int16b; Zha+17].
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND

2.1

Cryptography

2.1.1

Notation

Throughout this thesis, we denote κ ∈ N as the security parameter. We write {0, 1}κ
as the set of binary strings of length κ and {0, 1}∗ to indicate the set of all finite, binary
strings.

Negligible function.

We often need to show that cryptographic schemes can be broken

with only very small probability that goes to 0 faster than any inverse polynomial. We call
such probabilities, negligible. The formally definition of negligible function is as follows.
Definition 1. We call a function negl negligible if for every polynomial poly, there exists
an N such that for all κ > N , negl(κ) <
2.1.2

1
poly(κ)

Probabilistic inequalities

Theorem 1 (Bernoulli’s inequality). For q ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, (1 − p)q ≥ 1 − pq
Theorem 2 (Chernoff bounds). Suppose {Xi : i ∈ [n]} are mutually independent Boolean
P
random variables, with P r[Xi = 1] = p, for all i ∈ [n]. Let X = ni=1 Xi and µ = pn.
Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1],

Pr[X ≤ (1 − δ)µ] ≤ e{ δ 2 µ/2} and Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤ e{ δ 2 µ/3}
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2.1.3

Cryptographic Primitives

2.1.3.1

Collision-resistant hash functions

Generally, hash functions are used to compress any arbitrary-length strings into
shorter strings. More precisely, each hash function H of size κ has a table of length κ,
then for each input string x, it will store x with the corresponding shorter string H(x)
in the table. A hash function should be ”good” in the sense that it only yields as few as
possible pairs of the distinct input x and x0 with the same hash strings, i.e., H(x) = H(x0 )
(called collision). Also, collision resistance does not mean that no collisions exist, simply
that they are hard to find.
Informally, a function H is collision resistant if it is infeasible for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm to find a collision in H. In other words, collisions should be
very hard to find. In [LK14], the formal definition of a hash function is as follows.
Note that, for formal presentation, we consider a family of hash functions indexed
by a key s. However, different from cryptographic keys, the key s is 1) not kept secret,
and 2) will be generated by an algorithm Gen.
Definition 2. A hash function is a pair of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (Gen, H)
satisfying the following:
• Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1κ and
outputs a key s. We assume that 1κ is implicit in s.
• There exists a polynomial ` such that H takes as input a key s and a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and outputs a string Hs (x) ∈ {0, 1}`(κ) (where κ is the value of the security parameter
implicit in s)
Definition 3. A hash function Π = (Gen, H) is collision-resistant if for all polynomial-time
adversaries A, there exists a negligible function negl such that
10

Pr[Hash-collA,Π (κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ)
where the experiment Hash-collA,Π (κ) is defined as follows.
The collision-finding experiment Hash-collA,Π (κ):
• A key s is generated by running Gen(1κ ).
• The adversary A is given s and outputs x, x0 . (If Π is a fixed length hash function for
0

inputs of length `0 (κ) then we require x, x0 ∈ {0, 1}` (κ) .)
• The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if and only if x 6= x 0 and Hs (x) =
Hs (x0 ). In such a case we say that A has found a collision.
We also emphasize that hash functions used in practice are often unkeyed. In other
words, a fixed hash function H is defined, and there is no longer any notion of a Gen
algorithm. However, it is important to include keys theoretically since it is not clear how
to define a meaningful notion for the unkeyed hash functions [LK14],
2.1.3.2

Digital signature

Digital signature is a tool to preserve the integrity of messages. More concretely, any
signer with an established public and private keys can sign message in such a way that
other parties can use the public key to verify that the message is originated from the signer
who has the keys. A signature scheme is “secure” if no party can force a valid signature
without having the secret key. In [LK14], the formal definition of a digital scheme is as
follows
Definition 4. A signature scheme is a tuple of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Sign, Verify) satisfying the following:
1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1κ and outputs
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a pair of keys (vk, sk). These are called the public key and the private key, respectively.
We assume for convenience that vk and sk each have length at least κ, and that κ can
be determined from vk, sk.
2. The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a private key sk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ .
It outputs a signature σ, denoted as σ ← Signsk (m).
3. The deterministic verification algorithm Verify takes as input a public key vkm a message m, and a signature σ. It outputs a bit b, with b = 1 meaning valid and b = 0
meaning invalid. We write this as b := Verifyvk (σ, m).
It is required that for every κ, every vk, sk output by Gen(1κ ), and every m ∈ {0, 1}∗ , it
holds that

Verifyvk (m, Signsk (m)) = 1
If (Gen, Sign, Verify) is such that for every (vk, sk) output by Gen(1κ ), algorithm Signsk
is only defined for messages m ∈ {0, 1}`(κ) (and Verifyvk outputs 0 for m 6∈ {0, 1}`(κ) , then
we say that (Gen, Sign, Verify) is a signature scheme for messages of length `(n)).
A signature scheme is used as follows: a singer S runs Gen(1κ ) to get the public and
private keys (vk, sk). Then publicly announce the public key vk belonging to the signer
S. If S needs to send a message m to other party, it computes σ ← Signsk (m) and gives
(m, σ) to the receiver. The receiver knowing the public key vk can verify the authenticity
of m by checking whether Verifyvk (σ, m) = 1.
Intuitively, we want to ensure that no malicious party can force a valid signature and
message pair without knowing the corresponding secret key. In other words, only the
owner of the key pair can produce the valid signatures. Let Π = (Gen, Sign, Verify) be a
signature scheme. The security of the signature scheme is formally defined as follows.
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Definition 5. A signature scheme Π = (Gen, Sign, Verify) is existentially unforgeable under
an adaptive chosen-message attack if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A,
then there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr[Sig-forceA,Π (κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ)
where the signature experiment Sig-forceA,Π (κ) is defined as follows:
• Gen(1κ ) is run to obtain keys (vk, sk).
• Adversary A is given vk and oracle access to Signsk (·). (This oracle returns a signature
Signsk (m) for any message m of the adversary’s choice.) The adversary then outputs
(m, σ). Let Q denote the set of messages whose signatures were requested by A during
its execution.
• The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if and only if (1) Verifyvk (m, σ) = 1,
and (2) m 6∈ Q.

Unique signature scheme. Unique signature scheme was introduced in [Lys02],
which consists of four algorithms, a randomized key generation algorithm uKeyGen, a deterministic key verification algorithm uKeyVer, a deterministic signing algorithm uSign,
and a deterministic verification algorithm uVerify. We expect for each verification key
there exists only one signing key. We also expect for each pair of message and verification key, there exists only one signature. We have the following definition.
Definition 6. We say (uKeyGen, uKeyVer, uSign, uVerify) is a strengthened unique signature scheme, if it satisfies:

Correctness of key generation: Honestly generated key pair can always be verified. More for-
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mally, it holds that

Pr


κ

(pk, sk) ← uKeyGen(1 ) : uKeyVer(pk, sk) = 1

≥ 1 − negl(κ)

Uniqueness of signing key: There does not exist two different valid signing keys for a verification key. More formally, for all ppt adversary A, it holds that


κ
 (pk, sk1 , sk2 ) ← A(1 )

Pr 
 ≤ negl(κ)
: uKeyVer(pk, sk1 ) = 1 ∧ uKeyVer(pk, sk1 ) = 1 ∧ sk1 6= sk2
Correctness of signature generation: For any message x, it holds that


κ
 (pk, sk) ← uKeyGen(1 ); σ := uSign(sk, x) 
Pr 
 ≥ 1 − negl(κ)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ) = 1
Uniqueness of signature generation: For all ppt adversary A,


κ
 (pk, x, σ1 , σ2 ) ← A(1 )

Pr 
 ≤ negl(κ)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ1 ) = 1 ∧ uVerify(pk, x, σ2 ) = 1 ∧ σ1 6= σ2
Unforgeability of signature generation: For all ppt adversary A,


κ
uSign(sk,·) κ
(1 ) 
 (pk, sk) ← uKeyGen(1 ); (x, σ) ← A
Pr 
 ≤ negl(κ)
: uVerify(pk, x, σ) = 1 ∧ (x, σ) 6∈ Q
where Q is the history of queries that the adversary A made to signing oracle
uSign(sk, ·).

Instantiations for the unique signature scheme.

Efficient instantiations can be

found in literature. For example, the well-known BLS signature [BLS01] can be a good
candidate.
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2.1.4

The standard simulation paradigm

We here provide a (tailored) review of the standard simulation paradigm [GMW87].
We remark that this section follows closely Canetti’s elegant work [Can00b, Sections 3,4]
but we restrict it in the standalone setting; furthermore, protocol composition has been
excluded since this is not our focus.
2.1.4.1

ITM

For the readers’ convenience, we use the following ITM related definitions from
Canetti’s work [Can00b].
Definition 7. An interactive Turing machine (ITM) M is a Turing machine with the following augmentations:
Special tapes (i.e., data structures):
• An identity tape. The contents of this tape is interpreted as two strings. The first string
contains a description, using some standard encoding, of the program of M (namely,
its transition function). We call this description the code of M . The second string is
called the identity of M . The identity of M together with its code is called the extended
identity of M . This tape is “read only”. That is, M cannot write to this tape.
• An outgoing message tape. Informally, this tape holds the current outgoing message
generated by M, together with sufficient addressing information for delivery of the
message.
• Three externally writable tapes for holding inputs coming form other computing devices
(or, processes):
– An input tape, representing inputs from the “calling program(s)” or external user.
– An incoming communication tape, representing information coming from other
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programs within the same “protocol instance”.
– A subroutine output tape, representing outputs coming from programs or modules
that were created as “subroutines” of the present program.
• A one-bit activation tape. Informally, this tape represents whether the ITM is currently
“in execution”.
New instructions:
• An external write instruction. Roughly, the effect of this instruction is that the message
currently written on the outgoing message tape is possibly written to the specified tape
of the machine with the identity specified in the outgoing message tape.
• A read next message instruction. This instruction specifies a tape out of { input, incoming communication, subroutine output }. The effect is that the reading head jumps to
the beginning of the next message.

Executing Systems of ITMs.

We specify the mechanics of executing a system that

consists of multiple ITMs. However, some significant differences from that sketch do
exist. First, here we make an explicit distinction between an ITM, which is a “static object”,
namely an algorithm or a program, and an ITM instance (ITI), which is a “run-time object”,
namely an instance of a program running on some specific data. In particular, the same
program (ITM) may have multiple instances (ITIs) in an execution of a system.
Second, the model provides a concrete mechanism for addressing ITIs and exchanging information between them. The mechanism specifies how an addresee is determined,
what information the recipient obtains on the sender, and the computational costs involved.
Third, the model allows the number of ITIs to grow dynamically in an unbounded
way as a function of the initial parameters, by explicitly modeling the “generation” of new
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ITIs. Furthermore, new ITIs may have dynamically determined programs. Here the fact
that programs of ITMs can be represented as strings plays a central role.
Fourth, we augment the execution model with a control function, which regulates the
transfer of information between ITIs. Specifically, the control function determines which
“external write” instructions are “allowed”. This added construct provides both clarity and
flexibility to the execution model: All the model restrictions are expressed explicitly and
in “one place.” Furthermore, it is easy to define quite different execution models simply
by changing the control function.

Writing to a tape of another ITI and invoking new ITIs. The mechanism that allows communication between ITIs is the external write instruction. The same instruction
is used also for invoking new ITIs. More specifically, the effect of an external write instruction is the following. Let µ = (M, id) denote the ITI which performs the external write
transition, The current contents of the outgoing message tape is interpreted (using some
standard encoding) as consisting of µ, followed by an extended identity µ0 = (M 0 , id0 ) of
a “target ITI”, a tape name out of {input, incoming communication, subroutine output },
and a string m called the message. Then:
1. If the control function C, applied to the current execution prefix, does not allow µ to
write to the specified tape of µ0 (i.e., it returns a disallow value) then the instruction
is ignored.
2. If C allows the operation, and an ITI µ00 = (M 00 ; id00 ) with identity id00 = id0 currently exists in the system (namely, one of the past configurations in the current
execution prefix has identity id0 ), then:
(a) If the target tape is the incoming communication tape, then the message m is
written on the incoming communication tape of µ00 , starting at the next blank
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space. (That is, a new configuration of µ00 is generated. This configuration is
the last configuration of µ00 in this execution, with the new information written
on the incoming communication tape.) It is stressed that the code M 00 of µ00
need not equal the code M 0 specified in the external write request.
This convention has the effect that an ITI does not necessarily know the code
of the ITI it sends messages to using the communication tape. The recipient
ITI learns neither the identity nor the code of the writing ITI. (Of course, this
information may be included in the message itself, but the model provides no
guarantees regarding the authenticity of this information.) The intuitive goal
is to capture the effect of standard communication over an untrusted medium,
such as a communication network.
(b) If the target tape is the input tape or subroutine output tape, and M 00 = M 0 ,
then the specified message is copied to the specified tape of µ00 , along with
the code and identity of µ. If M 0 6= M 00 then the message is not copied and µ
transitions to a special error state.
This convention has the effect that an ITI can verify the code of the ITI to
whom it provides input or subroutine output. Furthermore, the recipient of an
input or subroutine output knows both the identity and the code of the writing
ITI. The intuitive goal here is to capture the effect of communication between
processes within a trusted computing environment that allows verification of
the code of receiver and sender.
3. If C allows the operation, and no ITI with identity id0 exists in the system, then a
new ITI µ0 with code M 0 and identity id0 is invoked. That is, a new configuration
is generated, with code M 0 , the value id0 written on the identity tape, and a sufficiently long random string is written on the random input tape. Once the new ITI
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is invoked, the external-write instruction is carried out as in Step 2. In this case, we
say that µ invoked µ0 .
2.1.4.2

Simulation paradigm

The basic model of execution. Following [Can01; Can00b], a protocol is represented
as interactive Turing machines (ITMs), each of which represents the program to be run by
a participant. Specifically, an ITM has several tapes that can be written to by other ITMs:
the input and output tapes model the inputs from and the outputs to “father” programs or
I/O callers, the incoming communication tapes and outgoing communication tapes model
messages received from and to be sent to the network. It also has an identity tape that
cannot be written to by the ITM itself. The identity tape contains the program of the
ITM (in some standard encoding) plus additional identifying information specified below.
Adversarial entities are also modeled as ITMs.
We distinguish between ITMs (which represent static objects, or programs) and instances of ITMs, or ITIs, that represent interacting processes in a running system. Specifically, an ITI is an ITM along with an identifier that distinguishes it from other ITIs in the
same system. Since we consider a single session, the identifier only consists of a party
identifier (PID) that distinguishes among the parties in a protocol instance. Typically the
PID is also used to associate ITIs with “parties”, or clusters, that represent some administrative domains or physical computers.
The model of computation consists of a number of ITIs that can write on each other’s
tapes in certain ways (specified in the model). The identifier PID is a unique identifier of
the ITI in the system. With one exception (discussed within) we assume that all ITMs are
probabilistic polynomial time.
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Defining security of protocols.

Protocols that securely carry out a given task are de-

fined in three steps, as follows. First, the process of executing a protocol in an adversarial
environment is formalized. Next, an “ideal process” for carrying out the task at hand is
formalized. The parties have access to an “ideal functionality,” which is essentially an incorruptible “trusted party” that is programmed to capture the desired functionality of the
task at hand. A protocol is said to securely realize an ideal functionality if the process of
running the protocol amounts to “emulating” the ideal process for that ideal functionality. Below we overview the model of protocol execution (called the real-world model), the
ideal process, and the notion of protocol emulation.

The model for protocol execution.

The model of computation consists of the parties

running an instance of a protocol π, a network adversary A that controls the communication among the parties, and an environment Z that controls the inputs to the parties and
sees their outputs. The execution consists of a sequence of activations, where in each activation a single participant (either Z, A, or some other ITM) is activated, and may write on
a tape of at most one other participant, subject to the rules below. Once the activation of a
participant is complete (i.e., once it enters a special waiting state), the participant whose
tape was written on is activated next. (If no such party exists then the environment is
activated next.)
The environment is given an external input z and is the first to be activated. In its first
activation, the environment invokes the adversary A, providing it with some arbitrary
input. The environment can from now on invoke (namely, provide input to) only ITMs that
consist of a single instance of protocol π. That is, all the ITMs invoked by the environment
must have the same SID and the code of π.
Once the adversary is activated, it may read its own tapes and the outgoing communication tapes of all parties. It may either deliver a message to some party by writing
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this message on the party’s incoming communication tape or report information to Z by
writing this information on the subroutine output tape of Z. For simplicity of exposition,
in the rest of this paper we assume authenticated communication; that is, the adversary
may deliver only messages that were actually sent.
Once a protocol party (i.e., an ITI running π) is activated, either due to an input
given by the environment or due to a message delivered by the adversary, it follows its
code and possibly writes a local output on the subroutine output tape of the environment,
or an outgoing message on the adversary’s incoming communication tape. The protocol
execution ends when the environment halts. The output of the protocol execution is the
output of the environment. Without loss of generality we assume that this output consists
of only a single bit.
Let REALA,Π,Z (κ, z, r) denote the output of the environment Z when interacting
with parties running protocol π on security parameter κ, input z and random input
r = rZ , rA , r1 , r2 , ... as described above (z and rZ for Z; rA for A, ri for party Pi ). Let
REALA,Π,Z (κ, z) denote the random variable describing REALA,Π,Z (κ, z, r) when r is uniformly chosen. Let REALA,Π,Z denote the ensemble {REALA,Π,Z (κ, z)}κ∈N,z∈{0,1}∗ .
Remark 1. We note that in the rest of this research, we write EXEC for any execution including real or ideal execution.

Ideal functionalities and ideal protocols. Security of protocols is defined via comparing the protocol execution to an ideal protocol for carrying out the task at hand. A key
ingredient in the ideal protocol is the ideal functionality that captures the desired functionality, or the specification, of that task. The ideal functionality is modeled as another
ITM (representing a “trusted party”) that interacts with the parties and the adversary.
More specifically, in the ideal protocol for functionality F all parties simply hand their
inputs to an ITI running F. (We will simply call this ITI F. In addition, F can interact
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Fig. 1.: Ideal execution (left) and real execution (right) in the standard model

with the adversary according to its code. Whenever F outputs a value to a party, the
party immediately copies this value to its own output tape. We call the parties in the ideal
protocol dummy parties. Let φ denote the ideal protocol for functionality F.

Securely realizing an ideal functionality.

We say that a protocol π emulates proto-

col φ if for any network adversary A there exists an adversary (also known as simulator)
S such that no environment Z, on any input, can tell with non-negligible probability
whether it is interacting with A and parties running π, or it is interacting with S and
parties running φ. This means that, from the point of view of the environment, running
protocol π is as good as interacting with φ. We say that π securely realizes an ideal functionality F if it emulates the corresponding ideal protocol φ. More precise definitions
follow. A distribution ensemble is called binary if it consists of distributions over {0, 1}.
Definition 8. Let π and φ be protocols. We say that π emulates φ if for any adversary A there exists an adversary S such that for any standalone environment Z, we have
c

REALA,Π,Z ≡ IDEALS,φ,Z .
Definition 9. Let F be an ideal functionality and let π be a protocol. We say that π realizes
F if π emulates the ideal protocol φ.
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2.1.4.3

Ideal functionalities

We here describe some functionalities which can be useful for our protocols in the
body. We also discuss some of their implementations.

Random Oracle Functionality FRO . The random oracle model (e.g., [BR93]) captures
an idealization of a hash function. We here present the random oracle functionality FRO
that has been defined in [HM04].
Functionality FRO
The functionality FRO is parameterized by a security parameter κ, and interacts with a
set P of parties, and an adversary. The functionality keeps a list L (which is initially
empty) of pairs of bitstrings.
1. Upon receiving a value (m) (with m ∈ {0, 1}∗ ) from some party P ∈ P or from the
adversary, proceed as follows.
• If there is a pair (m, h̃) for some h̃ ∈ {0, 1}κ in the list L,set h := h̃.
• if there is no such pair, choose uniformly h ∈ {0, 1}κ and store the pair (m, h) in
L.
Once h is set, reply to the requesting party with (h).

Fig. 2.: Random oracle functionality FRO .

Multi-Session Signature Functionality F̂uSIG . We present the multi-session version
of the digital signature functionality in [Can03]. While the digital signature functionality can be realized by a signature protocol based on ordinary signature scheme, this
functionality here can be realized a signature protocol based on unique signature scheme.
The underlying part highlights the difference be between ours and that in [Can03]. The
definition of unique signature scheme can be found below.
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Functionality F̂uSIG
The functionality F̂uSIG interacts with a set of signers {S1 , . . . , Sk }, and a set of verifiers
{V1 , . . . , Vn }, and an adversary S.
Key Gerneration:
Upon receiving input (Keygen, sid, ssid) from a signer
P ∈ {S1 , . . . , Sk }, verify that ssid = (P, ssid0 ) for some ssid0 .
If not,
ignore the request.
Otherwise, hand (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary, output
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) to the party P .
Signature Generation: Upon receiving input (Sign, sid, ssid, m) from a signer P ∈
{S1 , . . . , Sk }, verify that ssid = (P, ssid0 ) for some ssid0 . If not, ignore the request. Otherwise check if and no (ssid, m, σ, ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, output
(Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ). Otherwise, send (Sign, sid, ssid, m) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(ssid, m, σ, vk, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to P and halt. Otherwise, output (Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ) to P , and record the entry (ssid, m, σ, vk, 1).
Signature Verification: Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, ssid, m, σ, vk0 ) from some
party P ∈ {V1 , . . . , Vn }, hand (Verify, sid, ssid, m, σ, vk0 ) to the adversary. Upon receiving (Verified, sid, ssid, m, φ) from the adversary, do:
1. If vk0 = vk and the entry (ssid, m, σ, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
2. Else, if vk0 = vk, the signer of subsession ssid is not corrupted, and no entry
(ssid, m, σ 0 , vk, 1) for any σ 0 is recorded, then set f := 0.
3. Else, if there is an entry (ssid, m, σ, vk0 , f 0 ) recorded, then let f := f 0 .
4. Else, let f := φ and record the entry (ssid, m, σ, vk0 , φ).
Output (Verified, sid, ssid, m, f ) to P .

Fig. 3.: Multi-session signature functionality F̂uSIG .
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2.2

Blockchain technology

2.2.1

Blockchain Notations

As in the original Bitcoin white paper [Nak08], a proof-of-work (PoW) blockchain
is created and maintained by a set of players called PoW-miners. A PoW blockchain C
consists of a sequence of ` concatenated PoW-blocks B1 kB2 k · · · kB` , where ` ≥ 0. For
each blockchain, we specify several notations such as head, length, and subchain:
blockchain head, denoted head(C), refers to the topmost block B` in chain C;
blockchain length, denoted len(C), is the number of blocks in blockchain C, and here
len(C) = `;
subchain, refers to a segment of a blockchain; we use C[1, `] to denote an entire
blockchain, and use C[j, m], with j ≥ 1 and m ≤ `, to denote a subchain Bj k · · · kBm ;
in addition, we use C[i] to denote the i-th block Bi in blockchain C; finally, if
blockchain C is a prefix of another blockchain C 0 , we write C  C 0 .
Similar notations can be defined for a proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchain C˜ which consists of
a sequence of `˜ concatenated PoS-blocks B̃1 kB̃2 k · · · kB̃`˜ for `˜ > 0, and is maintained by
a set of players called PoS-holders.
2.2.2

Nakamoto’s blockchain

We here briefly review Nakamoto’s Bitcoin blockchain [Nak08]. Bitcoin blockchain
is based on proof-of-work puzzles [DN93; Bac02], which can be abstractly described via
the following hash inequality:
H(hw , ω, X ) < T
where hw ∈ {0, 1}κ is the hash of the previous proof-of-work block (κ is a security parameter), ω is a suitable solution for this puzzle, X is the record component of the block,
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and T denotes the current proof-of-work target. See [GKL15] for more details.
Extending the chain. At any point of the protocol execution, each miner attempts to
extend the blockchain. More concretely, upon receiving some record X , a miner chooses
random ω ∈ {0, 1}κ and checks whether ω is a valid solution to the above hash inequality
with respect to hw , hash value of the last block in the blockchain; if so, the miner reveals
the solution to the system. In Nakamoto’s design, multiple miners might find distinct
solutions with the same preceding block, in which a blockchain fork will be introduced.
To resolve this issue, all well-behaved (honest) miners are expected to follow the longest
blockchain in the system.
Security. Garay et al. [GKL15] and Pass et al. [PSS17a] have already rigorously analyzed
the security of Nakamoto’s blockchain in the cryptographic setting. In a nutshell, the
Nakamoto’s blockchain satisfies certain important security properties such as common
prefix, chain quality and chain growth, under the assumption that the majority of computing power is controlled by honest players.

26

CHAPTER 3

MODEL

3.1

Modeling blockchain protocol execution
In order to study the security of Bitcoin-like protocol, Garay et al. [GKL15] and then

Pass et al. [PSS17a] set up the first cryptographic models by following Canetti’s formulation of the “real world” executions [Can00a; Can00b]. In this section, we borrow many
ideas from their formulations. We further extend their models so that more blockchain
protocols, e.g., 2-hop blockchains, are allowed.
Network communication. The underlying communication for blockchain protocols are
formulated via a functionality FNET which captures the atomic unauthenticated “send-toall” broadcast in an asynchronous communication setting. The functionality is parameterized by an upper bound ∆ on the network latency, and interacts with players under
the direction of the adversary. More concretely, the functionality proceeds as follows.
Whenever it receives a message from a player, it would contact the adversary to ask the
adversary to specify the delivery time for the message. Note that, if the specified delivery
time exceeds the delay upper bound ∆, the functionality would not follow the adversary’s
instruction, and only delay the message to a maximum number of ∆ rounds. That said, no
messages are delayed more than ∆ rounds. In addition, the adversary could read all messages sent by all honest players before deciding his strategy; the adversary may “spoof”
the source of a message they transmit and impersonate the (honest) sender of the message.
The functionality FNET is formally described in Figure 4.
PoW-miners and PoS-holders. We specify two types of players PoW-miner and
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Functionality FNET
The functionality is parametrized by ∆, and interacts with a set P of PoS-players, and the adversary.
• Upon receiving (Broadcast, m) from a party P where P ∈ P , send (Broadcast, P, m) to S and
record (P, m, D) where D = 1.
• Upon receiving (Delay, m, P0 , P00 , t) from S where P0 , P00 ∈ P (here, the adversary can “spoof”

the source of the message), then
– If there is a record (P, m, b) such that D = 1 and if D + t ≤ ∆, then set D := D + t, record
(delay, P0 , P00 , m, D)
– Otherwise, ignore the message.
• Upon receiving (Send) from the adversary.
– For all record of form (delay, ·, ·, ·, D), set D := D − 1,
– Check for all record of form (delay, ·, ·, ·, D) such that D = 0, then send the messages to the

specified receivers in the form.

Fig. 4.: Network functionality FNET .
PoS-holder which correspond to two types of chains, specifically, PoW-chain and
PoS-chain; and two types of rounds that execute in turn: PoW-round and PoS-round.
These two types of chains are tied and grow together (at the same rate.) That said, a
chain-pair including a PoW-chain and a PoS-chain should have two member chains of
the roughly similar length. If the PoW-chain or PoS-chain in this pair grows too fast, this
chain-pair becomes invalid. Note that the PoW-miners and PoS-holders are playing different roles in our model; however, without the collaboration of these two types of players,
our model cannot be secure.
In our model, without loss of generality, we assume all PoW-miners have the
same amount of computing power and all PoS-holders have the same amount of stake.
Note that this is an “idealized model”. In the reality, each different honest PoW-miner
or PoS-holder may have a different amount of computing power/stake; nevertheless,
this idealized model does not sacrifice generality since one can imagine that real hon-
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est PoW-miners/PoS-holders are simply clusters of some arbitrary number of honest
idealized-model PoW-miners/PoS-holders. We note that the protocol’s players may never
be certain about the number of participants in the protocol execution, given the unauthenticated nature of the communication model. Moreover, for simplicity, only a standalone
static model is considered in this model, and the number of players is fixed during the
course of the protocol execution.
In each PoW-round, PoW-miners have ability proportionally to their computing
power to produce proof-of-work blocks. More concretely, upon receiving messages which
include many chain-pairs from the network, each PoW-miner would choose the best valid
chain-pair, and then utilize his computing power to solve the PoW puzzle in order to
extend the best chain-pair in this round. On the other hand, in each PoS-round, the
PoS-holder with the derived identity from the new PoW-block of the previous PoW-round
is able to generate a new PoS-block, and then appends the new block to the best chain-pair
on his local view. Note that, for each PoS-holder, the probability of being chosen is based
on the amount of stake that party has. The detail of our blockchain execution is presented
below.
The execution of proof-of-work blockchain protocol. Following Canetti’s formulation of the “real world” executions [Can00a; Can00b], we present an abstract model
for hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake blockchain protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in the hybrid
model where Πw and Πs denote the code run by PoW-miners and PoS-holders, respectively. We consider the execution of the blockchain protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) that is directed
by an environment Z(1κ ) (where κ is a security parameter), which activates an n bounded
number of PoW-miners and ñ bounded number of PoS-holders. The execution proceeds in
rounds. Without loss of generality, we assume that odd rounds correspond to PoW-miners,
and even rounds correspond to PoS-holders. The environment Z can “manage” protocol
players through an adversary A that can adaptively corrupt honest parties.
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Preparation phase. Any active PoW-miners and PoS-holder, before participating in the
mining process, will obtain additional information from the system based on its initial
state. More concretely, PoW-miners and PoS-holder will obtain the entire blockchain information from the system, and store the blockchain information in its storage.
Execution phase. Any active PoW-miners or PoS-holder can join the mining process
after the preparation phase. The mining process consists of multiple rounds. In each
round, the environment Z provides inputs for all miners and receives outputs from these
miners, and the miners communicate with each other. More concretely, in each round,
each honest miner receives an input from the environment Z, and potentially receives
incoming network messages (delivered by the adversary A), and then updates its local
storage; then based on the stored information, it carries out some mining operations; in
the case that a new block is generated, the miner sends out the new block via Broadcast()
which will be guaranteed to be delivered to all miners in the beginning of the next round.
Note that, at any point of the execution, the environment Z can communicate with the
adversary A or access the local information of the miners. In addition have ideal access
to an unbounded number of copies of some ideal functionality F.
For simplicity, we consider the static computing power and stake setting (where the
total amount of computing power and stakes invested to the protocol will not change
over time). We consider adaptive adversaries who are allowed to take control of protocol
players on the fly. At any point of the execution, Z can send message (Corrupt, P ) to
adversary A. From that point, A has access to the party’s local state and controls P .
Let EXECF
Π,A,Z be a random variable denoting the joint view of all parties (i.e., all
their inputs, random coins and messages received, including those from the random oracle and signatures) in the above F-hybrid execution; note that this joint view fully determines the execution. Whenever F are clear from context we often write EXECΠ,A,Z or
EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z .
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3.2

Modeling proof-of-work

3.2.1

∗
Functionality FPoW

In our setting, the PoW-miners have limited ability to produce proofs of work. To cap∗
ture this, all PoW-miners are assumed to have access to a physical resource setup FPoW

which manages a huge “farm of computing devices” (represented by “nonces”), and these
devices are provided by the environment Z through the adversary. In order to utilize the
computing power of the functionality, each player needs to register the computing ser∗
vices of FPoW
or disconnect the services at some later points. Indeed, this captures the

dynamic computing power setting where different players could consume the computing
∗
resource for different windows of time. Functionality FPoW
abstracts out the Bitcoin like

mining process; this will simplify the design and analysis of protocols based on such min∗
ing ecosystem. Here, each PoW-miner is able to request one search query from FPoW
that

consumes one unit of computing power granted in each execution round. Then the player
can only find it with a certain probability p. Besides the computing services, the setup
also provides the verification services which allow any player to verify solutions in many
times. Please refer to Figure 5 for more details.
As discussed above, this is an “idealized” interpretation of the setting where all miners
have the same amount of computing power; nevertheless, this idealized model does not
sacrifice generality. The adversary A is allowed to perform at most t queries per round,
where t is the number of corrupted PoW-miners. Thus, the computing power is consumed
by querying the functionality in a bounded number of times.
We remark that we are not the first to formulate the setup of computing resources.
∗
Earlier efforts can be found in [KMS14; PSS17a]. We argue that, our FPoW
formulation is

more rigorous than the previous efforts; we explicitly model how the computing resource
is managed and distributed from the environment to parties. In our model, each party can
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∗
Functionality FPoW

The functionality is parameterized by a PoW parameter p , a PoW security parameter κ, and interacts with PoW-miners {W1 , . . . , Wn }, PoS-holders {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }, as well as an adversary S .
1. Computing Resource Registration. Upon receiving a message (Work-Register, Wi ) from
party Wi ∈ {W1 , . . . , Wn }, pass the message to the adversary. Upon receiving a message
(Work-Registered, Wi , ω) from the adversary, record (Wi , ω), and pass ω to the party Wi (the
party Wi registered.)
2. Work Query. Upon receiving (Search, ω, context) from a PoW-miner Wi or from the adversary
where ω ∈ {0, 1}κ , proceed as follows.
(a) If there is record (·, hcontext, ωi, bwi ), then send (Searched, Wi , bwi ) to the player.
(b) Otherwise, check If (Wi , ω) is not recorded, then ignore the message. Otherwise, if (Wi , ω)
is recorded (the party Wi registered and granted one unit of computational resource), then
delete the record (Wi , ω), and process the following.
• with probability p , set bwi := 1, (the party Wi discovers the solution,)
• with probability 1 − p , set bwi := 0. (the party Wi does not discover the solution.)

Then record (Wi , hcontext, ωi, bwi ). Then send (Searched, Wi , bwi ) to the player Wi
3. Work Verification Query. Upon receiving (RO-Verify, context, ω) from a party P where P ∈
{W1 , . . . , Wn , Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } or from the adversary, check if there exists a recorded entry
(·, hcontext, ωi, bwi ) then send (RO-Verified, bwi ) to the party P . Otherwise, output error.
∗
Fig. 5.: Proof-of-work functionality FPoW
.

register and receive the computing resource represented by nonce ω under the control of
the environment. That said, this model naturally captures the joining of new players or
the rejoining of old players.
∗
Furthermore, our FPoW
is closely related to, but different from FTree in [PSS17a] and

FStX [Bad+17] . In [PSS17a], a “per protocol” approach is taken. That is, for different
blockchain protocol, say GHOST protocol [SZ15], a different variant of FTree should be
defined. We take a different approach; we abstract the essence of the underlying resources,
∗
and our proof-of-work functionality FPoW
can be used for different PoW-based blockchain

protocols, and we do not need to revise the setup per protocol. Similar to FTree and ours,
In [Bad+17], the functionality FStX abstracts out the election process where messages are
accepted with a certain probability. However, FStX additionally checks the validity of the
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“input messages“ (“context“ in our functionality) with respect to the historical state. On
∗
only captures the proof-of-work mining mechanism, the validity
the other hand, our FPoW

of the context is not covered. This demonstrates the purpose of our model. Specifically,
we want to abstract the proof-of-work mechanism or how players find the solutions for
∗
can be used to analyze any PoW-based blockchain protocols.
puzzles only. This FPoW

3.2.2

∗
in FRO -hybrid model
Implementing FPoW

∗
is implemented by a random
As discussed in section 3.2.1, the functionality FPoW

oracle functionality FRO [HM04]. We denote φ∗PoW as the ideal protocol for an ideal func∗
tionality FPoW
and πPoW as the protocol in the FRO -hybrid model. In the ideal protocol

φ∗PoW , players are dummy since they just forward the messages received from the envi∗
ronment Z to the functionality FPoW
, and then forward the messages received from the

functionality to the environment. On the other hand, upon receiving messages from the
environment, the players in πPoW execute the protocol and then pass the outputs to the
environment. Note that, we allow each PoW-miner to receive only one unit of computing
power (one chance of querying the random oracle) per round.
Essentially, protocol πPoW captures the core of PoW-based blockchain (e.g., Bitcoin).
Informally, πPoW carries out the following two main steps: first, each PoW-miner is
able to“mine” for a puzzle solution of a hash inequality; after that, any other players
(PoW-miners or PoS-holders) can verify the found solution. The formal description of
protocol πPoW is given in Figure 6.
Let S be the adversary against the ideal protocol φ∗PoW , and A be the adversary against
the hybrid protocol πPoW . We now show that πPoW is as “ secure” as φ∗PoW with respect
RO
to the adversary S. Let EXECF
πPoW ,A,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view

of all parties in the execution of πPoW with the adversary A and an environment Z. In
F∗

addition, let EXECφ∗PoW,S,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view of all parties in
PoW
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Protocol πPoW

The protocol is parameterized by a PoW parameter p and a security parameter κ.
Each PoW-miner Wi , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, proceeds as follows.

1. Upon receiving (Work-Register, Wi ) from the environment Z , if (Wi , ω) is already recorded,
then ignore the message. Otherwise, choose ω ∈ {0, 1}κ , record (Wi , ω), and pass the message
(Work-Registered, Wi , ω) to the environment.
2. Upon receiving (Search, Wi , context) from the environment Z , if recored ω , then query the functionality FRO on input B = (context, ω) and then obtain output h . If h ≤ T where T = p · 2κ , set
bwi := 1. Otherwise, if h > T, set bwi := 0 send (Searched, Wi , bwi ) to the environment.
Each player P
∈
{W1 , . . . , Wn , Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } proceeds as follows.
Upon receiving
(RO-Verify, context, ω) from the environment Z , send (context, ω) to the functionality FRO
and receive h . If h ≤ T, set bwi =:= 1. Otherwise, if h > T, set bwi := 0. Then send
(RO-Verified, bwi ) to the environment.

Fig. 6.: Proof-of-work protocol πPoW .
the execution of φ∗PoW with the adversary S and an environment Z.
Lemma 1. Consider protocol πPoW in Figure 6 and the ideal protocol φ∗PoW described above.
Assume pn  1, where p is a PoW parameter and n is the total number of PoW-miners. It
F∗

RO
PoW
holds that the two ensembles EXECF
πPoW ,A,Z and EXECφ∗ ,S,Z are perfectly indistinguishPoW

able.
Proof. We show that the two executions are perfectly close by the following simulation.
Consider the adversary A for πPoW , we now construct an adversary S on input 1κ and a
PoW parameter p for φ∗PoW as follows. Note that, the adversary S stores a table T .
∗
1. Upon receiving (Work-Register, Wi ) from the functionality FPoW
for honest par∗
ties, choose random ω ← {0, 1}κ , then send (Work-Registered, Wi , ω) to FPoW
.

For corrupted parties, wait to receive (context, ω) when the corrupted parties (controlled by A) query FRO and set the nonce.
2. Upon receiving (context, ω) from any party Wi (corrupted or uncorrupted), if there
is a record ((context, ω), bwi , h) in T , then send h to Wi . Otherwise, if there is no
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∗
record ((context, ω), bwi ), send (Search, ω, context) to FPoW
and
∗
. if bwi = 1 choose random h ∈
Upon receiving (Searched, Wi , bwi ) from FPoW

{0, 1}κ such that h ≤ T. Otherwise if bwi = 0 choose random h ∈ {0, 1}κ such that
h > T where T = p · 2κ . Then record ((context, ω), bwi , h). and then send h to Wi
Since there are no interactions with the adversary A or corrupted parties in registration phase and verification query phase, the simulator does not need to simulate
these phases.
F∗

RO
PoW
We demonstrate that EXECF
πPoW ,A,Z and EXECφ∗ ,S,Z are perfectly indistinguishable. This
PoW

is done by showing that the joint view of all parties in the execution of πPoW with adversary A and environment Z is perfectly indistinguishable from the joint view of all parties
in the execution of φ∗PoW with S and Z. We can easily see that (1) each random oracle
query from A is sampled uniformly at random from a set {0, 1}κ , and (2) each work query,
∗
or verification query to FPoW
is also sampled uniformly at random from the set {0, 1}κ .
F∗

RO
PoW
Therefore, the two ensembles EXECF
πPoW ,A,Z and EXECφ∗ ,S,Z are perfectly close.
PoW

3.3

Modeling proof-of-stake

3.3.1

Unpredictable unique signature functionality FuuSIG

The usual unique signature functionality is too weak for proof-of-stake related proposals since the adversary can see the distribution of signatures and predict future election. Thus, we need the unpredictability of the signature scheme. This is formalized via
the unpredictable unique signature scheme in Figure 7

35

Functionality FuuSIG
The functionality FuuSIG interacts with a set of signers {S1 , . . . , Sk }, and a set of verifiers
{V1 , . . . , Vn }, and an adversary S.
1. Key Gerneration:
Upon receiving input (Keygen, sid, ssid) from a signer
P ∈ {S1 , . . . , Sk }, verify that ssid = (P, ssid0 ) for some ssid0 .
If not,
ignore the request.
Otherwise, hand (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary, output
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) to the party P .
2. Signature Generation: Upon receiving input (Sign, sid, ssid, m) from a signer P ∈
{S1 , . . . , Sk }, verify that ssid = (P, ssid0 ) for some ssid0 . If not, ignore the request. Otherwise check if and no (ssid, m, σ, ·, ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, output
(Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ, h). Otherwise, send (Sign, sid, ssid, m) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(ssid, m, σ, ·, vk, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message to P and halt.
Otherwise, choose random h ∈ {0, 1}κ and output (Signature, sid, ssid, m, σ, h) to P ,
and record the entry (ssid, m, σ, h, vk, 1).
3. Signature Verification: Upon receiving a message (Verify, sid, ssid, m, σ, h, vk0 ) from
some party P ∈ {V1 , . . . , Vn }, hand (Verify, sid, ssid, m, σ, vk0 ) to the adversary. Upon
receiving (Verified, sid, ssid, m, φ) from the adversary, do:
(a) If vk0 = vk and the entry (ssid, m, σ, h, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
(b) Else, if vk0 = vk, the signer of subsession ssid is not corrupted, and no entry
(ssid, m, σ 0 , vk, 1) for any σ 0 is recorded, then set f := 0.
(c) Else, if there is an entry (ssid, m, σ, vk0 , f 0 ) recorded, then let f := f 0 .
(d) Else, let f := φ and record the entry (ssid, m, σ, vk0 , φ).
Output (Verified, sid, ssid, m, f ) to P .

Fig. 7.: Unpredictable unique signature functionality FuuSIG .
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3.3.2

∗
Functionality FPoS

∗
In this subsection, we introduce our proof-of-stake functionality FPoS
describing the

usage of virtual resource in our system. Please refer to Figure 8 for more details.
∗
Similar to the proof-of-work functionality FPoW
, the proof-of-stake functionality are

introduced to capture the leader election process via the virtual resource, i.e., stakes. Intuitively, players having stake will have a certain chance (with probability p̃) of being elected
as the leader. This guarantees that the more stakes players have, the better chances of being elected.
3.3.3

∗
Implementing FPoS
in {FuuSIG , FRO }-hybrid model

∗
We denote φ∗PoS as the ideal protocol for an ideal functionality FPoS
, and πPoS as pro-

tocol in the {FuuSIG , FRO }-hybrid model. In the ideal protocol φ∗PoS , the dummy players
∗
only forward the messages received from the environment to the functionality FPoS
, and

then forward the messages received from the functionality to the environment. Informally, each PoS-holder through his stake determines whether he is the elected leader in
the current round or not; then he is able to generate a valid signature, which can later be
verified by any other players. The protocol πPoS is formally described in Figure 9.
Let S be the adversary against the ideal protocol φ∗PoS , and A be the adversary
F∗

against protocol πPoS . Let EXECφ∗PoS ,S,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view
PoS

of all parties in the execution of φ∗PoS with the adversary S and an environment Z. Let
uuSIG ,FRO
EXECF
πPoS ,A,Z be the random variable denoting the joint view of all parties in the execu-

tion of πPoS with the adversary A and an environment Z.
Lemma 2. Consider φ∗PoS described above and πPoS in Figure 9. Assume p̃ ñ  1, where p̃
is a PoS parameter and ñ is the total number of PoS-holders. It holds that the two ensembles
F∗

uuSIG ,FRO
EXECφ∗PoS ,S,Z and EXECF
πPoS ,A,Z are perfectly indistinguishable.
PoS
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∗
Functionality FPoS

The functionality is parameterized by a PoS parameter p̃ , a security parameter κ, and interacts
with PoW-miners {W1 , . . . , Wn }, PoS-holders {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }, as well as an adversary S .
1. Stake Resource Registration.
Upon receiving a message (Stake-Register, Sj ) from party Sj ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }, if there is an
entry (Sj , 1), then ignore the message. Otherwise, pass the message to the adversary. Upon
receiving a message (Stake-Registered, Sj , vk) from the adversary, record (Sj , vk), and pass vk to
the party Sj (the party Sj registered.)
2. Stake Election: Upon receiving (Elect, vk, context) from a PoS-holder Sj , proceed as follows.
If (Sj , vk) is not recorded, then ignore the message. Otherwise, proceed the following.
• If (Elect, context, Sj , ω̃, vk, bsj ) has been recored, send (Elected, Sj , ω̃, bsj ) to Sj
• Otherwise,
– if (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, ·) has been recorded, then ignore the input.
– Otherwise, send (Elect-Sign, Sj , context) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Elect-Signed, Sj , context, ω̃) from the adversary, verify that no entry
(Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, 0) is recorded. If it is, then output an error message (Error) to
Sj and halt. Else, record the entry (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, 1).

Then
– with probability p̃ , set bsj := 1 and send (Elected, Sj , ω̃, bsj ) to Sj . (the party Sj is

elected.)
– with probability 1 − p̃ , set bsj := 0 and send (Elected, Sj , ω̃, bsj ) to Sj (the party Sj is
not elected.)
and record the entry (Elect, context, Sj , ω̃, vk, bsj ).
3. Stake Verification:

Upon receiving (Stake-Verify, (Sj , context), ω̃, vk) from a party P
{W1 , . . . , Wn , Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } or from the adversary,

∈

(a) If there exists a record of the form (Elect, context, Sj , ω̃, vk, bsj ) where bsj = 1 (the party
Sj is elected), hand (Stake-Verify, (Sj , context), ω̃, vk) to the adversary. Upon receiving
(Stake-Verified, (Sj , context, ω̃), φ) from the adversary, do:
• If (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, vk, 1) is recorded, then set f := 1.
• Else, if Sj is not corrupted, and no entry (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃ 0 , vk, 1) for any ω̃ 0 is
recorded, then set f := 0 and record the entry (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, vk, f )
• Else, if there is an entry (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, vk, f 0 ), then set f := f 0 .
• Else, set f := φ, and record the entry (Sign, Sj , context, ω̃, vk, f ).

Output (Stake-Verified, (Sj , context), f ) to the party P .
(b) Otherwise, if there is no record of the form (Elect, context, Sj , ω̃, vk) (the party Sj is not
elected), set f := 0, and output (Stake-Verified, (Sj , context), f ) to the party P .
∗
Fig. 8.: Proof-of-stake functionality FPoS
.
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Protocol πPoS
The protocol is parameterized by a PoS parameter p̃ and a security parameter κ.
Each S ∈ P0 , proceeds as follows.

1. Upon receiving (Stake-Register, S) from the environment, pass (Keygen, sid, ssid) for some
sid, ssid where ssid = (S, ssid0 ) for some ssid0 to the functionality FuuSIG . Upon receiving
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from F̂uSIG , record (S, vk). Then send vk to the environment.
2. Upon receiving (Elect, S, context) from the environment Z , send (Sign, sid, ssid, S, context) to the
functionality FuuSIG .
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, (S, context), ω̃, h) from FuuSIG , send (context, vk, ω̃, h) to the
functionality FRO and receives h̃ puzz .
• If h̃ puzz > T where T = p̃ · 2κ , then set bs := 0.
• Else, set bs := 1.

Send (Elected, S, ω̃, bs ) to the environment.
3. Upon receiving (Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃, h, vk) from the environment Z , then
send (Verify, sid, ssid, S, context, ω̃, h, vk) to the functionality FuuSIG .
Upon receiving
(Verified, sid, ssid, (S, context), f ) from the functionality FuuSIG . If f = 1, send (context, vk, ω̃, h)
to the functionality FRO and receives h̃ puzz .
• If h̃ puzz > T where T = p̃ · 2κ , then set f := 0.
• Else, set f := 1.

send (Stake-Verified, (S, context), f ) to the environment.

Fig. 9.: Proof-of-stake protocol πPoS .
Proof. We show that the two executions are perfectly indistinguishable by the following
simulation. Consider the adversary A for πPoS , we now construct an adversary S on input
1κ and a PoS parameter p̃ for φ∗PoS as follows. S stores a table T
Initialization and Stake Election:
1. Simulating the execution with an uncorrupted party S as follows. When S receives
∗
in the ideal process a message (Stake-Verified, P, context, ω̃) from FPoS
, where S

is uncorrupted, it proceeds as follows:
If this is the first time that S generates a signature, then simulate for A the process
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of key generation . That is, send to A (in the name of FuuSIG ) (Keygen, sid, ssid)
to the adversary, and receive (Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) from the adversary A, then send (Register, sid, ssid, vk) to the adversary A; upon receiving
(Registered, sid, ssid) from the adversary, then record the pair (ssid, vk).
2. Simulating the execution with a corrupted party S with FuuSIG as follows.
(a) Upon receiving (Keygen, sid, ssid) from party S, send to A (in the
name of FuuSIG ) (Keygen, sid, ssid) to the adversary,
(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk)

from

the

adversary

and receive

A,

then

send

(Verification-Key, sid, ssid, vk) (in the name of FuuSIG ) to S and record
(ssid, S, vk).
(b) Upon receiving (Sign, sid, ssid, S, context) from party S, check if no
(ssid, context, ·, ·) has been recorded. If not, ignore the request. Otherwise,
send (Sign, sid, ssid, context) to the adversary.
Upon receiving (Signature, sid, ssid, context, ω̃) from the adversary, choose
random h ∈ {0, 1}κ , output (Signature, sid, ssid, context, ω̃, h) to S, and
record the entry (ssid, context, ω̃, h, vk, 1).
(c) Then, instruct the corrupted party S send the message (Elect, S, context, vk)
∗
to FPoS
.

Upon

receiving

(Sign, sid, ssid, context)

from

∗
FPoS
,

send

∗
(Signature, sid, ssid, context, (ω̃, h)) to FPoS
.

3. Simulate the interaction of any party S with FRO as follows.
For query (context, vk, ω̃, h) from party S, send (Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃) to
∗
FPoS
and receive (Stake-Verified, (S, context), ω̃, f ). If f = 0, choose random

h̃ puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ such that h̃ puzz > T where T = p̃ ·2κ . If f = 1, choose h̃ puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ
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such that h̃ puzz ≤ T. Then store ((context, vk, ω̃, h), h̃ puzz )) in the table T and send
h̃ puzz to S.
Block Verification:
1. Simulating the execution with an uncorrupted party S as follows. When notified by
∗
that some uncorrupted party S made a verification request, proceed as follows.
FPoS
∗
Upon receiving message (Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃, vk) from FPoS
, then forward

message (Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃, h, vk) (h is recored with context and ω̃ by S
∗
above) to A (in the name of FuuSIG ). Forward A’s response back to FPoS
.

2. Simulating the execution with a corrupted party S with F̂uSIG as follows.
(a) Instruct

the

corrupted

S

party

send

the

message

∗
(Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃, vk) to FPoS
.

(b) Upon receiving (Verify, sid, ssid, S, context, ω̃, h, vk) from a corrupted party
S, generate a response following the instructions of FuuSIG .
3. Simulate the interaction of any party S with FRO as follows.
For query (context, vk, ω̃, h) from party S check if ((context, vk, ω̃, h), h̃ puzz ))
in

the

table

(context, vk, ω̃),

T

and

h̃ puzz

send

to

S.

otherwise,

∗
send (Stake-Verify, S, context, ω̃) to FPoS

send

and receive

(Stake-Verified(S, context), ω̃, f ). If f = 0, choose random h̃ puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ
such that h̃ puzz > T where T = p̃ · 2κ . If f = 1, choose h̃ puzz ∈ {0, 1}κ such that
h̃ puzz ≤ T. Then store ((h prev , r, vk, ω̃), h̃ puzz )) in the table T and send h̃ puzz to S.
F∗

uSIG ,FRO
We now show that the two ensembles EXECφ∗PoS ,S,Z and EXECπF̂PoS
,A,Z are perfectly
PoS

close. Notice that for each election query, the adversary S is noticed by the functionality
∗
FPoS
whether this query is successful or not, then it samples the output randomly from

a set {0, 1}κ that satisfied inequality H(context, vk, ω̃, h) ≤ T̃ if the query is successful.
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Putting them together, the views of players in the two executions are perfectly indistinguishable.

3.3.4

Blockchain security properties

Previously, several fundamental security properties for 1-hop blockchain protocols
have been defined: common prefix property [GKL15; PSS17a], chain quality property
[GKL15], and chain growth property [KP15]. Intuitively, the chain growth property states
that the chains of honest players should grow linearly to the number of rounds. The common prefix property indicates the consistency of any two honest chains except the last κ
blocks. The chain quality property, aims at expressing the number of honest blocks’ contributions that are contained in a sufficiently long and continuous part of an honest chain.
Specifically, for parameters ` ∈ N and µ ∈ (0, 1), the ratio of honest input contributions
in a continuous part of an honest chain has a lower bounded µ.
We follow the same spirit to define the security properties for our 2-hop blockchain
protocol. Since each valid PoS-chain and PoW-chain exist in our system as a pair having
the same structure and grow at the same rate, we focus on the common prefix, chain
quality, and chain growth properties for the PoS-chain. The definitions for these properties
are formally given as follows.
Definition 10 (Chain growth). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. The chain growth
property Qcg with parameter g ∈ R, states that for any honest PoS-holder S ∈
{Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜0 in round r0 where r0 − r > 0,
˜ ≥ g · (r0 − r)
in EXECΠ,A,Z . It holds that len(C˜0 ) − len(C)
Definition 11 (Common prefix). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. The common prefix
property Qcp with parameter κ ∈ N states that for any two honest PoS-holders Si in round
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r and Sj in round r0 with the local PoS-chains C˜i , C˜j , respectively, in EXECΠ,A,Z where
i, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + ñ}, r ≤ r0 , it holds that C˜i [1, `i ]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ).
Definition 12 (Chain quality). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π. The chain quality
property Qcq with parameters µ ∈ R and ` ∈ N states that for any honest PoS-holder
S ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } with PoS-chain C˜ in EXECΠ,A,Z , it holds that for large enough `
consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ the ratio of honest blocks is at least µ.
We note that, the chain growth and common prefix for the PoW-chains would be
implied from the PoS-chain except the chain quality property since the adversary could
be able to attach more malicious PoW-blocks to the PoW-chain in case he controls the
majority of computing power.

New property: Chain soundness.

We here introduce a new security property, chain

soundness, which is critical for blockchain protocols in the open setting. A good protocol
in the open network environment, should ensure honest new players to join the system
securely. Intuitively, the protocol can help the new players to obtain a blockchain which is
compatible with the local chain of an existing honest player in some recent rounds. While
this property is not needed for protocols in the closed setting where new players are not
allowed, it is important for blockchains in the open network environments. Without this
security requirement, unsatisfactory protocols could be allowed. The chain soundness
property can be described as follows.
Definition 13 (Chain soundness). Consider 2-hop blockchain protocol Π with a set P of
players. Consider a new player Pi ∈ P with best local chain C˜i in round r, in EXECΠ,A,Z .
The chain soundness property Qcs states the following: for the new player Pi and any existing
players Pj with best local chain C˜j at round r we have that C˜i [¬κ]  C˜j and C˜j [¬κ]  C˜i .
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CHAPTER 4

INITIAL DESIGN AND PROVABLE SECURITY: 2-HOP BLOCKCHAIN

In this chapter, we propose a hybrid proof-of-work/proof-of-stake protocol. In our design,
as argued above, we (intend to) use both physical resources and virtual resources. That
means, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players — PoS-holder (stakeholder) —
is introduced in our system. Now a winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain
immediately. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder
to be “selected” to extend the blockchain. In short, in our system, a PoW-miner and then a
PoS-holder jointly extend the blockchain with a new block. If Nakamoto’s consensus can
be viewed as a 1-hop protocol, then ours is a 2-hop protocol.
4.1

2-hop design
We first give the high-level description of our 2-hop blockchain design in Sec-

tion 4.1.1; then in Section 4.1.2, we formally present our main protocol; the process of
choosing the best valid chain-pair among a set of chain-pairs can be found in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.1

High-level description

Nakamoto’s system is powered by physical computing resources and secure against
fully adaptive adversary who can corrupt participants at any moment. The blockchain is
maintained by PoW-miners; there, each winning PoW-miner can extend the blockchain
with a new block. In our design, as argued above, we (intend to) use both physical resources and virtual resources to achieve the same level of security— adaptive security.
That means, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players — PoS-holder (stakeholder)
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— is introduced in our system. Now a winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain
immediately. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder
to be “selected” to extend the blockchain. In short, in our system, a PoW-miner and then a
PoS-holder jointly extend the blockchain with a new block. If Nakamoto’s consensus can
be viewed as a 1-hop protocol, then ours is a 2-hop protocol.
A pictorial illustration of our 2-hop blockchain structure can be found in Figure 10:
red blocks are generated by PoW-miners in the first hops, while green blocks are produced by PoS-holders in the second hops; now naturally a PoW-chain consists the sequence of red blocks B1 , B2 , B3 , · · · , and a PoS-chain consists the sequence of green
blocks B̃1 , B̃2 , B̃3 , · · · . In fact, our 2-hop blockchain is bootstrapped from an “already
mature” blockchain denote as B−N . . . , B−1 , B0 for an integer N ; see the dark blocks in
the figure.
...

B−1

B0

B̃1

B̃2

B5

B4

B3

B2

B1

B̃3

B̃4

...

...
Rounds

Fig. 10.: 2-hop blockchain structure
Here, dot arrows denote the first hops, and solid arrows denote the second hops. Red blocks Bi ’s
denote the proof-of-work blocks, and green blocks B̃i ’s denote the corresponding proof-of-stake
blocks. Note that the dark-red blocks are from the “mature blockchain”.

In our scheme, there are two types of nodes, called miners and stakeholders (users).
Correspondingly, there are two types of chains: proof-of-work chain (PoW-chain), de˜ in the system. These PoW/PoS
noted C, and proof-of-stake chain (PoS-chain), denoted C,
chains are securely tied together, as a chain-pair. Stakeholders maintain the proof-of-stake
chain. On the other hand, miners together manage the proof-of-work chain which is con45

sidered as a biased random beacon for choosing stakeholder (to extend the proof-of-stake
chain).
• Extending the PoW-chain: To generate a new PoW-block, each miner first computes
the hash hw ∈ {0, 1}κ of the previous PoW-block (the head of the PoW-chain), the
hash hs ∈ {0, 1}κ of the head of the PoS-chain. To be noted that, the PoW chain and
PoS chain must have same length in a valid chain pair. The miner then attempts to
solve the following hash inequality
H(hw , hs , ω) < T
by finding a suitable solution ω where T denotes the current proof-of-work target.
PoW-block B is in the form B = hhw , hs , ωi.
If the miner succeeds in finding the proper ω, he then generates a new PoW-block
which includes the hash values hw , hs and the solution ω, and shares this PoW-block
to other players in the network.
• Extending the PoS-chain: In our design, each PoS player holds two pairs of
keys (vk, sk) and (vk0 , sk0 ) for digital signature schemes (Gen, Sign, Verify) and
(Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ), respectively. Here (Gen, Sign, Verify) is a unique digital signature scheme, while (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ) can be an ordinary digital signature scheme.
We note that, in our design, each PoW-block is used for selecting new stakeholders
(to generate new PoS blocks). More concretely, if there is a new PoW block B in
the system, any stakeholder whose verification key vk satisfies the following hash
inequality
H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃
is allowed to generate a new PoS block, where T̃ is the current proof-of-stake target,
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hw is the hash value of B and ω̃ ← Signsk (B).
PoS-block B̃ is in the form B̃ = h(B, ω̃, vk), X , σ, vk0 i, whereX ∈ {0, 1}∗ is
the payload of the proof-of-stake block B̃ (also denoted as payload(B̃)); and σ is
produced by the PoS player but by using a different signing key sk0 , i.e., σ ←
Sign0sk0 ((B, ω̃, vk), X ).
We emphasize again that (Gen, Sign, Verify) is a unique signature scheme, which is
critical for our design.
4.1.2

The main protocol

2-hop blockchain. It is important to note that in the Nakamoto PoW-based blockchain,
the assumption to secure the system is that malicious miners control less than the half of
computing power since if so they can fork a valid blockchain which breaks the consensus
of the blockchain protocol. In our system, in order to secure against such attack, we need
to combine two different resources: physical resource (i.e., computing power) and virtual resource (i.e., stake). Sequentially, we have two types of blockchains (PoW-chain and
PoS-chain) corresponding to two types of rounds — PoW-round and PoS-round executing
in turn — making 2-hop blockchain. Note that, in reality, one player could play both roles,
PoW-miner and PoS-holder; however, without loss of generality, we treat the two roles
separately. In order to tie them hard, the scheme maps each PoW-block to no more than
1 stakeholder. Only the stakeholder who has the privilege is able to generate the corresponding PoS-block of each PoW-block. Note that PoW-chains and PoS-chains existing in
our system are represented as pairs, and each player locally stores a chain-pair. Therefore,
the two member chains of each valid chain-pairs should have the same structure.
We now present our main protocol that describes the behaviour of PoW-miners and
PoS-holders. The PoW and PoS executions vary slightly. On one hand, in the PoW execu∗
tion, PoW-miners search for proof-of-work solutions via FPoW
. On the other hand, in the
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PoS execution, PoS-holders follow the growth of the PoW-chain and use that to extend
∗
. In general, PoW-miners and PoS-holders collect blockchain inthe PoS-chain via FPoS

formation from the network functionality FNET , perform some validation and generating
blocks, and then share their states with the network through FNET .
The protocol Π is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·), which determines the proper structure of the information that is stored into the blockchain as in
[GKL15; PSS17a]. Initialization of each party’s execution sets the round clock to zero and
sets the local chain-pair hCi , C˜i i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + ñ (n is the number of PoW-miners and
ñ is the number of PoS-holders), such that Ci := Cinit , C˜i := C˜init , where Cinit is our initial
blockchain, i.e., Cinit = B−N k . . . kB−1 kB0 , C˜init = 0k . . . k0k0, and len(Cinit ) = len(C˜init ).
We assume at the beginning of the protocol execution, a set of PoS-holders are already registered. The registration information are included in Cinit . We emphasize that
new players may be registered later during the execution. The new registration information will be included in the payload of the following PoS blocks.
Please refer to Figure 11 for more details of our main protocol.
4.1.3

The best chain-pair strategy

In this subsection, we describe the rules in which a single valid chain-pair is selected
for consensus. Roughly speaking, a chain-pair is the best valid pair if it has the longest
valid PoW-chain. We introduce process BestValid, which is run locally by PoW-miners
or PoS-holders, to select the best chain-pair. The BestValid process is parameterized by
a content validation predicate V (·) and an initial chain Cinit where V (·) determines the
proper structure of the information that is stored into the blockchain as in [GKL15], and
˜ in
takes as input chain-pair set C0 . Intuitively, the process validates all chain-pair hC, Ci
C0 , then finds the valid chain-pairs with the longest PoW-chain.
We emphasize that since each valid PoS-block is tied to a PoW-block, and each
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Protocol Π = (Πw , Πs )
The protocol is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·). Initially, set Ci := Cinit ,
C˜i := C˜init , where Cinit = B−N k . . . kB−1 kB0 and C˜init = 0k . . . k0k0, len(Cinit ) = len(C˜init ), and then
set state i := {hCi , C˜i i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + ñ .
1. PoW-Miner Πw . Each PoW-miner Wi , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, with local state state i proceeds as follows.
Without lost of generality, we assume that the PoW-miners already registered to the functionality
∗
FPoW
. For each odd round, upon receiving message (Input-Work, Wi ) from the environment Z ,
proceed as follows.
˜
(a) Select the best local chain-pair: Upon receiving many messages of the form (Message, P, hC, Ci)
from FNET for any party P ∈ {W1 , . . . , Wn , Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }, let C be the set of all chain-pair
collected from FNET , then compute hCbest , C˜best i := BestValid(C ∪ hCi , C˜i i, PoW-miner), and
then set Ci := Cbest and C˜i := C˜best .

(b) Attempt to extend PoW-chain:
• Create the pointer to the previous block: Send (head(Ci ), head(C˜i )) to the ideal functionality
FRO and receive h from FRO .
• Search for a puzzle solution: If h 6=⊥, then send (Work-Register, Wi ) to the ideal func∗
∗
tionality FPoW
and receive ω . Then send (Search, ω, h) to the ideal functionality FPoW
,
w
∗
and then receive (Searched, Wi , bi ) from FPoW .
• Generate a new PoW-block: If bwi = 1, set B := hh, ωi (which means Wi is the player
who found the puzzle solution in this round), set Ci := Ci kB , and state i := state i ∪
{hCi , C˜i i}. Then send (Broadcast, hCi , C˜i i) to FNET .

Return (Return-Work, Wi ) to the environment Z .
2. PoS-Holder Πs . Each PoS-holder Sj , for n + 1 ≤ j ≤ n + ñ , with local state state j , proceeds as
follows. Note that, initially, each PoS-holder sends (Stake-Register, Sj ) to the ideal functionality
∗
FPoS
and receive vk. Also, each PoS-holder registers to the ideal functionality FSIG and receive
vk0 Upon receiving message (Input-Stake, Sj , X ) from the environment Z where X denotes the
block-payload, proceed as follows.
˜
(a) Select the best local chain-pair: Upon receiving many messages of the form (Message, P, hC, Ci)
from FNET for any party P ∈ {W1 , . . . , Wn , Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }, let C be the set of all chain-pair
collected from FNET , then compute hCbest , C˜best i := BestValid(C ∪ hCj , C˜j i, PoS-holder), and
then set Cj := Cbest and C˜j := C˜best .

(b) Attempt to extend PoS-chain: Consider there is a new PoW-block B in Cbest .
∗
• Stake election: Send (Elect, vk, B) to the ideal functionality FPoS
, and receive
s
∗
(Elected, Sj , ω̃, bj ) from FPoS .

• Generate a signature: If bsj = 1, send (Sign, hB, X, Sj , ω̃i) to the ideal functionality FSIG ,
and receive (Signed, Sj , hB, X, Sj , ω̃i, σ) from FSIG .
• Generate a new PoS-block: Set B̃ := hB, ω̃, vk, X , σ, vk0 i. Next, set C˜j = C˜j kB̃ , and
state j := state j ∪ {hCj , C˜j i}. Then send (Broadcast, hCj , C˜j i) to FNET .

Return (Return-Stake, Sj ) to the environment Z .
∗
∗
Fig. 11.: Our main protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in the {FPoW
, FRO , FPoS
, FSIG , FNET }-hybrid

model with respect to the local process BestValid (See Figure 12).
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PoW-block or PoS-block is valid if their peers are valid. Thus, a chain-pair is valid if
all block-pairs in this chain-pair are valid. A valid chain-pair with respect to PoW-miners
should have two member chains (PoW-chain and PoS-chain) of the same length. On the
other hand, a valid chain-pair with respect to PoS-holders may have the PoW-chain longer
than the PoS-chain by one block since the PoW-chain might be extended by one new
block in the previous PoW-round. That said, if the player who executes this process is
a PoS-holder and if there exists a new PoW-blocks, this block would be validated separately since its corresponding PoS-block has not been generated yet. Thus, for every
chain-pair, the process first checks if the length of the PoW-chain in the pair is longer than
the PoS-chain by one block and validates this new PoW-block first, and then evaluates every block-pair of this chain-pair. As said, PoS-blocks are generated from PoW-blocks;
thus, PoS-blocks without corresponding PoW-blocks are not valid. After the validation,
the best valid chain-pair is the one with the longest PoW-chain. Please refer to Figure 12
for more details.
Remark 2 (Tie Breaking). Our protocol primarily deals with length so it makes sense to
adopt a simple tie breaking strategy to choose the best chain-pair from two chain-pairs
of equal length. While there is work that show the advantages of choosing a chain randomly (viz. [ES14]), we follow the simple strategy considered in [GKL15]; in which the
best chain-pair is the one with the PoW-chain that is lexicographically the smallest. If two
chain-pairs have same length, and the PoW-chains are same, we compare the PoS-chains with
the same tie breaking mechanism for PoW-chains.
4.2

Security analysis
Our 2-hop blockchain can be viewed as a natural generalization of Nakamoto’s fa-

mous 1-hop blockchain [Nak08]. The security analysis of the 2-hop blockchain here
is inspired and influenced by previous analysis of Nakamoto’s 1-hop protocol [GKL15;
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Process BestValid
The process BestValid is parameterized by a content validation predicate V (·) and an initial
chain Cinit . The input is (C0 , Type).
˜ ∈ C0 , and proceed as follows.
For every chain-pair hC, Ci
˜ and Type = PoS-holder, then set ` := len(C). Then verify the new
1. Check if len(C) − 1 = len(C)
PoW-block C[`] as follows.
˜ − 1]) to FRO and
Parse C[`] to obtain hh` , ω` i, send (C[` − 1], C[`
0
then receive (h). If h 6= h` , remove this chain-pair from C .

• Verify the pointer in C[`]:

• Verify the PoW solution in C[`]:

Parse C[`] to obtain C[`] := hh, ωi. Send message
If f = 0,
remove this chain-pair from C0 .
∗
(RO-Verify, h, ω) to the functionality FPoW
, and then receive (RO-Verified, f ).

˜ and V (payload(C))
˜ = 1, or len(C) − 1 = len(C)
˜ and Type = PoS-holder. If
2. Check if len(C) = len(C)
˜ to len(Cinit ), proceed as follows.
yes, for i from len(C)
• Verify PoW-block C[i]:
– Verify the pointer in C[i]:

˜ − 1]) to FRO
Parse C[i] to obtain hhi , ωi i, send (C[i − 1], C[i

and then receive (h).
– Verify the PoW solution in C[i]:
∗
FPoW

Send message (RO-Verify, C[i]) to the functionality
, and then receive (RO-Verified, h 0 ).

If hi 6= h or f = 0, set b1 := 0. Else, set b1 := 1.
˜
• Verify PoS-block C[i]:

˜ to obtain hB, ω̃, S, vk, X , σ, vk0 i.
Parse C[i]

send (Verify, ((B, ω̃, S), X ), σ, vk0i ) to FCERT ans receive (Verified, ((B, ω̃, S), X , )f ).
if f = 1set b2 := 1; b2 := 0 otherwise.
∗
.
– Then send message (Stake-Verify, (B, X, Sj ), ω̃, vk) to the functionality FPoS
∗
Upon receiving message (Stake-Verified, (B, X, Sj ), f ) from FPoS , if f = 0 or
B 6= C[i], set b3 := 0. Else, set b3 := 1.

–

•

If b1 = 0 or b2 = 0, or b3 = 0, remove this chain-pair from C0 .

3. Otherwise, remove this chain-pair from C0 .
Find the valid chain-pair hCbest , C˜best i ∈ C0 with the longest PoW-chain. Then set hCbest , C˜best i
as the output.

Fig. 12.: The chain set validation process BestValid.
Intuitively, BestValid ensures that, if Type = PoS-miner, every valid chain-pair should have its
member chains C and C˜ of the same length. On the other hand, if Type = PoS-holder, we allow the
PoW-chain longer than the PoS-chain by one block since there may a new PoW-block produced in
the previous rounds.
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PSS17a]. In order to improve the readability, in general, we will keep consistency of notations. We use the original letters to denote the PoW parameters for the first hop, e.g., α;
we use letters with tilde to denote the PoS parameters for the second hop, e.g., α̃; finally,
we use letters with hat to denote the collective parameters for both hops, e.g., α̂.
We use the flat mode to simplify of the security analysis. Consider the total number
of PoW-miners is n, the portion of malicious computing power is ρ, and a PoW parameter
p.
Let α = 1 − (1 − p)(1−ρ)n be the probability that at least one honest PoW-miner mines
a block successfully in a round .
Let β = ρnp be the expected number of PoW-blocks that malicious PoW-miners can
find in a round.
Here, when pn  1, we have α ≈ (1 − ρ)np, and thus

α
β

≈

1−ρ
.
ρ

We assume 0 < α  1,

0 < β  1 and α = λβ where λ ∈ (0, ∞). We note that, in Nakamoto protocol, λ must
be greater than 1; but in our setting λ could be less than 1, i.e., the malicious parties could
control more computing resource.
We then describe the important parameters in the second hop (i.e., proof-of-stake
blockchain). Similar to that in the first hop, we consider the total number of PoS-holders
is ñ, the portion of malicious stakes is ρ̃. Let p̃ be the probability that a PoW-block is
mapped to a PoS-holder. We assume p̃ ñ  1, so we have:
Let α̃ = 1 − (1 − p̃)(1−ρ̃)ñ ≈ (1 − ρ̃)ñp̃ be the probability that a PoW-block is mapped
to at least one honest PoS-holder.
Let β̃ = 1 − (1 − p̃)ρ̃ñ ≈ ρ̃ñ p̃ be the probability that a PoW-block is mapped to at least
one malicious PoS-holder.
It is obvious that we have a parameter α̂ = αα̃ which is the probability that honest
parties find a new PoW-block and is mapped to an honest PoS-holder in a round. We also
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have β̂ = β β̃ it the expected number that malicious parties find new PoW-blocks and are
mapped to malicious PoS-holders in a round. We say α̂ and β̂ are collective resources for
honest parties and malicious parties respectively.
We consider the network delay model as in [PSS17a]. We will show in section 4.2.4,
γ̂ =

α̂
1+2∆α̂

can be viewed as a “discounted” version of α̂ due to the fact that the messages

sent by honest parties can be delayed by ∆ rounds; γ̂ corresponds to the “effective” honest
collective resource. We also assume (α + β)∆  1.
We are now ready to state our main theorems.
Theorem 3 (Chain Growth for PoS-chain). Consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2.
For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜0
˜ ≥
in round r0 where t = r0 − r > 0, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that len(C˜0 ) − len(C)
g · t is at least 1 − e−Ω(t) where g = (1 − δ)γ̂.
Theorem 4 (Chain Quality for PoS-chain). We assume γ̂ = λ̂(α+β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1. Consider
protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ }
with PoS-chain C˜ in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that, for large enough ` consecutive
PoS-blocks of C˜ which are generated in s rounds, the ratio of honest blocks is no less than
β̃
is at least 1 − e−Ω(`) .
µ = 1 − (1 + δ) (α+β)
γ̂

Theorem 5 (Common Prefix for PoS-chain). We assume α̂ = λ̂(α+β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1. For any
δ > 0, consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For
any two honest PoS-holders Si in round r and Sj in round r0 , with the local best PoS-chains
C˜i , C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z where r ≤ r0 and i, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + ñ}, the
probability that C˜i [1, `i ]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) is at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
Theorem 6 (Chain Soundness for PoS-chain). We assume α̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1.
Consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any
new spawned honest player PoS-holder Si and any existing honest player Sj in round r,
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with the local best PoS-chains C˜i , C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that
C˜i [1, `]  C˜j and C˜j [1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) is at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
We notice that the assumptions of γ̂ are different in chain quality and common prefix
properties. This is because if the malicious players want to destroy chain quality property,
he could recycle the computing power from honest miners.
4.2.1

Analysis ideas

In this section, we informally introduce the analysis idea. In our scheme, there are
two types of players, PoW-miners and PoS-holders (stakeholders). Both PoW-miners and
PoS-holders can be honest or malicious. In order to extend the pair of blockchains, a
PoW-miner needs to generate a PoW-block first, and then the corresponding stakeholder
∗
will sign this block (via FPoS
) . We note that, our security analysis mainly focuses on

PoS-chain, and the analysis for PoW-chain is followed from PoS-chain’s. Consider that
players may be honest or malicious, we have 4 types of compositions.
Case 1: An honest PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to an honest
PoS-holder. The honest PoS-holder will sign the corresponding PoS-block.
Case 2: A malicious PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to a malicious PoS-holder. The malicious PoS-holder will sign the corresponding PoS-block.
Case 3: An honest PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to a malicious
PoS-holder. The malicious PoS-holders may sign it or just discard it.
Case 4: When a malicious PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to an
honest PoS-holder. He may ask the honest PoS-holder to sign or just discard it.
We first explain the proof intuition. The malicious players cannot prevent Case 1;
therefore, they cannot prevent the growth of blockchain and Case 1 will guarantee chain
growth property. Furthermore, the malicious parties can generate PoS-blocks from Case
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2 and Case 3. In some consecutive rounds, the total number of PoS-blocks from malicious
players are bounded by these two cases. If the probability of Case 2 and Case 3 is smaller
than Case 1, the malicious players cannot generate more PoS-blocks than the honest players. Since the malicious players cannot prevent Case 1, what they can do is to compete
the blocks from the honest players with their own. Even if they win all of the competition
there are still some blocks from honest players remaining. This will guarantee the chain
quality property. Finally, we assume the probability that all of the PoW-miners find a new
PoW-block in a round is very small. This means there is no new block being broadcast
in most of the rounds. If all of the honest players do not receive the new block for some
rounds, they would take the same best chain-pair, because they have the same view of the
main chain-pair. If the malicious players want to diverge the view honest players, they
must send new blocks regularly. From our assumption, the malicious players do not have
enough resources to do that. This will bring us common prefix property.
We emphasize here, in Case 2 or Case 3 the malicious stakeholder may sign multiple
PoS-blocks based on one PoW-block, and he may send different PoS-blocks to different
honest miners. However, our scheme will not be effectively attacked by this malicious
strategy. Here, all the PoS blocks (generated by the malicious stakeholder) are valid candidate bases for generating the next PoW-block. Once a PoW-block is generated based on
one candidate PoS-block, all of other PoS-blocks (generated by the malicious stakeholder
based on the previous PoW-block) will not be extended by any honest miners.
As discussed above, α̂ = αα̃ and β̂ = β β̃ are the collective probabilities of Case 1
and Case 2, respectively. We define them as the collective resources of the honest and
malicious parties, respectively.
We also assume the malicious players may delay the messages from honest players
for a while. We assume that the malicious players can delay any messages in at most
∆ rounds. The intuition is that if the malicious players delay the messages, then the
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honest players might not get the real best chain-pair on time. This will cause the honest
miners working on a wrong chain-pair during the delayed rounds. As a result, the honest
computing power is wasted during these delayed rounds. We use discounted resource to
measure the actual probability that the honest players can generate a block in a round.
The worst case for the chain growth property is that the malicious players will delay all
honest messages to exact ∆ rounds in order to decrease the probability that honest players
succeed.
For simplicity, we only discuss the average case for some rounds in this section. The
worst case is guaranteed by Chernoff bound if it is in a long time.

Chain growth.

In order to calculate the chain growth rate, we consider the worst case

for the honest players. As we discussed, the malicious players cannot prevent Case 1.
The best strategy for the malicious players is to delay all of the messages from the honest
players to discount the honest resources (computing power and stake) of honest players
at most. In our scheme, there are two hops to extend a pair of blocks, so the malicious
players have two chances to delay the messages. They can delay at most 2∆ rounds for
a PoS-block generation. We use γ̂ to denote the discounted collective honest resources
where γ̂ =

α̂
.
1+2∆α̂

We use a hybrid execution to formalize the worst delay setting in the formal proof.
In the hybrid execution, the malicious players contribute nothing to the chain growth and
delay all honest messages to decrease the chain growth rate. We use best public chain-pair
to imply the chain-pair with the longest PoW-chain and known to all honest players. It
is easy to see that when Case 1 happens, the best public chain-pair will increase by 1
block-pair (one PoW-block and one PoS-block). Probability γ̂ is the probability a round is
Case 1. The worst chain growth rate is guaranteed by γ̂.
In the real execution, the probability of Case 1 will not be smaller than that in the
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hybrid execution. The message from malicious players will not decrease the chain growth
that is contributed by honest players. Therefore, the real chain growth rate is not worse
than that in the hybrid execution.

Chain quality.

In order to decrease the chain quality, the best strategy for malicious

parties is to generate as many PoS-blocks as they can. The malicious players can generate
PoS-blocks in Case 2 and Case 3. The total probability of these two cases for a round is
(α + β)α̃.
During any t consecutive rounds, the chain growth rate is at least γ̂t on average. The
malicious players will contribute at most (α + β)α̃t. The chain quality will remain at least
1−

(α+β)α̃
.
γ̂

Common prefix. The adversary can delay any honest messages in at most ∆ rounds,
if an honest PoW-miner generates a new block, the corresponding PoS-block will be received in 2∆ later rounds by all honest players. This implies that if no honest player
broadcasts new block in the past 2∆ rounds, all honest players would have same view on
the blockchains, unless malicious players send new block. We say it is a silent round. A
new block will effect the system in at most 2∆ rounds. We assume 2(α + β)∆  1. The
probability that a round is a silent round is 1 − 2(α + β)∆.
We say a round is an honest successful round if there is at least one honest player
generating a new block. An honest successful round is guaranteed by α. We consider
a special case of an honest successful round where only one honest miner generates a
new block. We say it is a pure successful round. In the flat model, we can view the hash
queries are independent. Thus, the success of one query will not effect other queries. In a
successful round, there is at least one successful query. We get rid of this successful query
and consider the others. The probability of a successful query of the others is still no more
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than α. Thus, the probability of pure successful round is α(1 − α). It approximates to α if
we assume α  1.
We assume the malicious players don’t send any new block in the following case first.
We consider the case that a round is a silent round and also a pure successful round. This
means the successful PoW-miner will generate a unique public chain-pair with the longest
PoW-chain for all honest players. If in the following 2∆ rounds, no honest PoW-miner
sends a new block, then all honest players would take the same best chain-pair. This
means all honest players will be convergent. The only exception is that the malicious
players generate blocks to prevent this convergence. However, by our assumption, the
malicious players cannot generate enough blocks to do this.

Chain soundness. In our protocol, the players select the best chain doesn’t depend
on any existing status they collected. This means that the new spawn player can take the
same strategy as existing players.
More specifically, the new spawned player Si can receive the local best chain of any
existing honest player Sj . Let C˜i and Sj be the best local chain Si and Sj .
• If C˜i = C˜j , the chain soundness is guaranteed.
• If C˜i =
6 C˜j , we have C˜i is better than C˜j . The adversary can let another player Sm
take C˜i . If the soundness property is broken then the common prefix property is
broken for Sm and Sj .
We emphasize that the soundness property doesn’t hold directly in some pure PoS
schemes such as [CM17; Kia+17; DPS17]. In these schemes, the existing players take best
chain depending on the state of previous rounds. New spawned players must get help
from extra assumption to get the correct state.
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Addressing adaptive corruption.

In our protocol, the adversary can corrupt any

player adaptively at any time. The only limitation is the collective resource is honest
majority. We give the analysis idea in two cases:
• In the PoW phase, adversary cannot predict which player will succeed to find a solution of PoW hash puzzle before the solution is broadcast. The adaptive corruption
of PoW miner will not bring extra advantage comparing with static corruption.
• In the PoS phase, the input of hash inequality includes the signature of stake holder
which is unforgeable for adversary. This will guarantee that adversary cannot predict which stake holder will be elected before the PoS block is broadcast. The adaptive corruption of stake holder will not bring extra advantage comparing with static
corruption.

More details can be found in 4.2.3.

On adaptive key generation. In PoS shceme, the malicious players may generate
and register their verification key vk adaptively to increase the probability that they are
elected. We will prove that our scheme is secure for adaptive key generation. The intuition is we combine the PoW and PoS blocks as a pair, and the PoW block will contribute
randomness for the following PoS block election. The adversary cannot generate a verification key vk adaptively before the PoW block is generated. However, after a PoW block
is generated, it is late to register an adaptive key in the transaction. More details can be
found in 4.2.5.
4.2.2

Important terms

We now provide some important terms which are useful for our analysis.
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Definition 14 (Honest Successful Round). We say a PoW-round r is an honest successful
round, if in this round, at least one honest PoW-miner finds a new solution.
Definition 15 (Pure Successful Round). We say a PoW-round r is a pure successful round,
if in this round, exact one honest PoW-miner finds a new solution.
Definition 16 (Honest Stake Successful Round). We say a PoS-round r is an honest stake
successful round, if a new PoW-block B, which is generated from an honest successful round,
is mapped to an honest PoS-holder, and the PoS-holder broadcasts a new PoS-block after this
round.
Remark 3. As discussed in previous section, a PoS-block may be invalid because the delay
of the messages on the network. Here, the honest stake successful round also only consider
that the real valid PoS-block is generated.
Definition 17 (Valid Malicious PoW-block). We say a PoW-block B is a valid malicious
PoW-block if (1) the PoW-block B is generated by a corrupted (malicious) PoW-miner, and
(2) it is mapped to a corrupted PoS-holder.
˜ is a hidden chain-pair, if it
Definition 18 (Hidden chain-pair). We say a chain-pair hC, Ci
is not known to any honest players.
˜ is a hidden
Definition 19 (Hidden PoS-chain). We say C˜ is a hidden PoS-chain, if hC, Ci
chain-pair.
˜ is public, if is known to all
Definition 20 (Public chain-pair). We say a chain-pair hC, Ci
honest players.
Definition 21 (Best Public PoS-chain). We say a PoS-chain C˜ is the best public PoS-chain, if
a) C˜ has been received by all of the honest players, b) C˜ is the PoS-chain of the best chain-pair
among all of the public chain-pairs.
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Now we briefly analyze the probability that a PoS-round is an honest stake successful
round. We have the probability that a round is an honest successful round is α. Since
the new block generated in the honest successful round will be mapped to a PoS-holder
∗
uniformly by FPoS
, the probability that an honest stakeholder is selected is α̃. Therefore,

the probability that a PoS-round is an honest stake successful round is αα̃ on average.
We consider the probability that a round is a pure successful round. It is easy to see
that this probability is less than the probability that a round is honest successful because
in some honest successful rounds there may be more than one honest PoW-miner find a
new solution. If α  1, we will see the two probabilities are close.
Lemma 3. Let α  1. For any r, the probability that round r is a pure successful round is
at least α − α2 .
Proof. If round r is a pure successful round, round r must be an honest successful round.
Suppose an honest miner finds a new solution in round r. The computing power is flat
among all of the miners, get rid of one successful honest miner will not effect the total
computing power very much. If the other miners find a new solution in round r, then
the probability that the other miners don’t find any new solution is at least (1 − α) on
average. Putting them together, the probability that round r is a pure successful round is
at least
α(1 − α) = α − α2 ≈ α

Following a similar argument, the number of valid malicious PoW-blocks that the
malicious miners will generate in a PoS-round is β β̃ on average. We remark that, in an
honest stake successful round, the honest PoS-holder can generate a valid PoS-block for
the best local chain chain-pair and send to all of the parties. The malicious stakeholders
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can append the valid malicious PoS-blocks to their (hidden) chain-pair and send the new
solution to some (not necessary all) honest parties.
Furthermore, the honest miners may generate a PoW-block which is mapped to a
malicious stakeholder and vice versa. We describe the following cases:
• Case 1: When an honest PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped
to an honest PoS-holder he would broadcast the PoW-block. The chosen honest
∗
PoS-holder will query the corresponding signature to FPoS
for that PoW-block and

then produce the corresponding PoS-block. In general, this case will help the honest
public best chain-pair to grow.
• Case 2: When a malicious PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
a malicious PoS-holder, he would send the block to the corresponding PoS-holder
and get the PoS-block. The malicious parties may keep this pair of blocks hidden to
grow a hidden chain-pair.
• Case 3: When an honest PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
a malicious PoS-holder he would still broadcast it. The malicious PoS-holders may
take it to increase the length of chain-pair or just discard this block in order to
prevent the growth of the best public chain-pair.
• Case 4: When a malicious PoW-miner finds a new PoW-block which is mapped to
an honest PoS-holder. If he sends the PoW-block to the corresponding PoS-holder,
then all honest parties would receive it eventually. If it is accepted, it may help to
grow the best public chain-pair, or the malicious PoW-miner may just discard the
block to prevent the growth of chain-pair.
As the discussion, α̂ = αα̃ and β̂ = β β̃ are the collective probabilities of Case 1 and
Case 2. We define them as the collective resources of the honest and malicious parties,
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respectively. We remark that, the malicious players may choose different strategy on the
4 cases for different purposes. For example, if they want to prevent the chain growth, they
may discard as more PoW-blocks as possible. If they want to decrease the chain quality,
∗
they may recycle all of the PoW-blocks that they can “sign” (via FPoS
) to generate more

PoS-blocks.
4.2.3

Analysis with adaptive corruption

In our model, we consider the adversary who can adaptive corrupt honest parties
at any time. The only limitation is the total number of corrupted players. The collective
resources are honest majority at any time.
In this section, we will prove that such adaptive corruption will not help the adversary gain any advantages other than static corruption. Static corruption means that the
corruption happens at the very beginning of the protocol execution. Let’s consider two
different executions EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z (σ) with static corruption and EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A0 ,Z (σ)
with adaptive corruption above, where σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution. Note
that, the adaptive adversary A0 has the same amount of resources as a static adversary A,
we have the following lemma:
Lemma 4. Consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Figure 11. Let EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z (σ) denotes the
execution with static corruption and EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A0 ,Z (σ) denotes the execution with adaptive corruption where σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution. Consider the two executions at round r are identical. It holds that the two distributions EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z (σ) and
EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A0 ,Z (σ) are identical at round r + 1.
Proof. If there is no new corruption instruction at round r + 1. The two executions are
identical.
Consider that, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A0 ,Z (σ), the adversary send (Corrupt, P ) at round
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r + 1 and in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z (σ), P is corrupted at the beginning.
∗
, we have:
With the functionality FPoW

If P is a PoW miner, the adversary can not predict if P will generate a PoW block in
round r+1 even adversary collect the context at round r. The probability that P generates
a PoW block is identical in the two execution.
∗
With the functionality FPoS
, we have:

If P is a stake holder, the adversary can not predict if P is elected to sign a PoS
block in round r + 1 even adversary collect the context at round r. The probability that
P generates a PoS block is identical in the two execution.
By Lemma 4, we only consider static corruption in the analysis.
4.2.4

Analysis with bounded delay

We assume that the malicious parties can delay messages in some bounded time
through the functionality FNET which captures the asynchronous network scenario. The
malicious parties can delay any messages on the network in at most ∆ rounds (this is guaranteed by FNET ) which we say it is a ∆-bounded channel. When an honest PoW-miner
finds a new PoW-block, he will broadcast it to the system and hope all parties will receive
it. If some parties don’t receive the message, the view of the honest stakeholders will keep
remaining divergent for this block. Following a similar argument, if the adversary delays
a message of PoS-block from an honest stakeholder, the view of the honest parties will
diverge for that PoS-block. It is easy to see that for a pair of PoW-block and PoS-block,
the malicious parties have two chances to delay the message to prevent the honest parties
achieving the same view.
As discussed, if any message can be delayed for ∆ rounds, a new pair of blocks can
be delayed in at most 2∆ rounds. The intuition is that the delay of messages will de-
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crease the efficiency of block mining. This is because the honest players may not get the
real best chain-pair including the real best PoW-chain and PoS-chain and will therefore
work on some inferior chain-pair. If honest players produce a new block-pair (including a
PoW-block and its corresponding PoS-block) during the delay time and later receive a better chain-pair, the new block-pair will be useless and the work for mining the PoW-block
in this block-pair is wasted. As mentioned, we will introduce the “effective” honest collective resources γ̂ to capture this intuition later.
Before we do the formal analysis we will give the definition of a silent round.
Definition 22 (Silent Round). We say round r is a silent round, if no PoW-miners (both
honest and malicious) publish any new PoW-chain in the 2∆ previous rounds of round r to
any honest party.
It is easy to see that all honest players will take the same best chain-pair at silent
rounds, unless the malicious players send a better chain-pair. This is because the malicious
players can delay a new solution from honest player in at most 2∆ rounds. We will show
that in our parameter setting, most of the rounds are silent rounds.
Lemma 5. Let 2(α + β)∆  1. For r > 0 and any δ > 0, the probability that round r is a
silent round is 1 − 2(1 + δ)(α + β)∆ with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) , where t > 0.
Proof. During any t consecutive rounds, the PoW-miners will generate X = (α + β)t
blocks on average. By Chernoff bound, we have Pr[X > (1 + δ)(α + β)t] < 1 − e−Ω(t) .
Any new blocks may effect at most 2∆ rounds. This means, there are at most 2X∆
rounds that are not silent in t rounds. The total number of silent rounds in t rounds is
t − 2X∆. If t is large, we ignore the bad event that X > (1 + δ)(α + β)t. The probability
that a round is silent round in t rounds is:
t − 2X∆
> 1 − 2(1 + δ)(α + β)∆
t
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.
4.2.4.1

Hybrid expriment

To analyze the best strategy of the adversary and the worst scenario that may happen to the honest players, we here consider the following executions. Let REAL(σ) =
EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z (σ) denote the typical execution of (Πw , Πs ) where
1. σ > 0 is the randomness in the execution,
2. Messages of honest players may be delayed by FNET in at most ∆ rounds.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the messages produced in PoW-rounds
may be delayed to PoS-rounds, and messages produced in PoS-rounds may be delayed to
PoW-rounds.
Let HYBr (σ) = EXECr(Π∆w ,Π∆s ),A,Z (σ) denote the hybrid execution as in real execution
except that after round r, HYBr (σ) has the following modifications from REAL(σ):
1. The randomness is fixed to σ as in HYBr (σ),
2. FNET delays messages generated by honest PoW-miners to exact ∆ rounds if the new
PoW-block is mapped to an honest stakeholder,
3. FNET delays all messages generated by honest PoS-holders to exact ∆ rounds,
4. Remove all new messages sent by the adversary to honest players, and delay currently undelivered messages from corrupted parties to the maximum of ∆ rounds,
5. Whenever some message is being delayed, no honest PoW-miners query the func∗
tionality FPoW
until the message is delivered.

In the REAL(σ) executions, the number of honest stake successful rounds is not less
than in the HYBr (σ).
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The following lemma shows that the PoS-chain of every honest player cannot decrease in length if we maximally delay messages from honest parties, freeze all honest
players during this delay, and drop all adversarial messages for every fixed randomness
σ. This means the hybrid execution is not worse than real execution.
Lemma 6. For all σ, r, t > 0, given two executions REAL(σ) and HYBr (σ). Let s = r + t.
For any honest PoS-holder Sj at round s, let C˜s,j denote the PoS-chain of Sj at round s in the
0
execution REAL(σ) and C˜s,j
denote the PoS-chain of Sj at round s in the HYBr (σ). We then
0
have len(C˜s,j ) ≥ len(C˜s,j
).

Proof. We prove this lemma by induction. We consider the initial state before round r.
From the definition of hybrid experiment, all players have same view at round r. We have
0
). We use · to denote all players and all rounds before round r.
len(C˜·,· ) ≥ len(C˜·,·

We suppose it holds for all players before round s − 1. The only possibility that
0
0
len(C˜s,j ) < len(C˜s,j
) is the player Sj received a new chain to extend C˜s,j
at round s in

HYBr (σ). According to the definition of hybrid experiment, this extended PoW-block
0
) =
must be generated at round s − 2∆ by an honest player Wj 0 , that makes len(C˜s,j
0
˜
˜0
len(C˜s−2∆,j
0 ) + 1. By the induction hypothesis, len(Cs−2∆,j 0 ) ≥ len(Cs−2∆,j 0 ). At the same

time, the player Wj 0 must succeed to extend PoW-block at round s − 2∆ in REAL(σ).
This extension will make C˜s−2∆,j 0 increase by one block. For player Wj 0 is honest, Sj must
have received the extension at (or before) round s.
0
Putting them together, len(C˜s,j ) ≥ len(C˜s,j
).

4.2.4.2

Analysis in the worst delay setting

As mentioned earlier, the malicious players can delay the messages on the network
in at most ∆ rounds. This will make some efforts of honest players be wasted. This means
the network delay will discount the collective resources of honest players, the following
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lemma will measure the discount in the execution of HYBr (σ).
Lemma 7. Consider HYBr (σ). Let α, α̃ > 0. We assume that the malicious players will
delay any message for at most ∆ rounds. Let γ̂ be the actual probability that a round s > r
is an honest successful stake round, we have γ̂ =

α̂
.
1+2∆α̂

Proof. Consider the HYBr (σ) execution, if round r0 > r is an honest stake successful round,
∗
then all PoW-miners will not query FPoW
during 2∆ rounds.

Now, assume there are actual c honest stake successful rounds from round r to r +
t,t > 0 in HYBr (σ). We then have the number of actual working rounds for honest
miners will remain t − 2∆c. For each round, the probability that it is an honest stake
successful round is α̂. We have α̂(t − 2∆c) = c. This implies that c =
get γ̂ =

α̂t
1+2∆α̂

= γ̂t. We

α̂
.
1+2∆α̂

Let viewr denote the view at round r for any execution of REAL(σ) and r > 0. Let
len(viewr ) denote the length of the best public PoS-chain chain at round r in viewr . The
following lemma demonstrates that each stake successful round would contribute one
PoS-block to the best chain-pair after 2∆ rounds in an execution of HYBr (σ).
Lemma 8. Consider execution HYBr (σ). For any honest stake successful round s > r,
len(views ) − len(views−2∆ ) ≥ 1.
Proof. By Definition 16, there is at least one honest PoS-holder producing a PoS-block at
round s. Let C˜s−2∆ be the PoS-chain that is extended by the PoS-holder at round s − 2∆.
We have len(C˜s−2∆ ) ≥ len(views−2∆ ). Let C˜s be the PoS-chain that is extended by the
PoS-holder at round s. At the end of round s, all honest players will receive the extended
chain, we have len(C˜s ) = len(C˜s−2∆ ) + 1. Thus, we have len(views ) ≥ len(C˜s ). Putting
them together, we have len(views ) − len(views−2∆ ) ≥ 1.
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Corollary 7. Consider execution HYBr (σ). Suppose there are h honest stake successful
rounds from round r to round r + t, it holds that len(viewr+s ) − len(viewr ) ≥ h.
Proof. Let rk be the kth honest stake successful round where r < rk < r+t and 1 ≤ k ≤ h.
From Lemma 8, we have len(viewrk ) − len(viewrk −∆ ) ≥ 1.
P
len(viewr+t ) − len(viewr ) ≥ hi=1 {len(viewrk ) − len(viewrk −∆ )} ≥ h
4.2.5

Analysis with adaptive key generation

∗
with some
In the protocol Πs , PoS-holder is elected by the ideal functionality FPoS

probability. In the implementation, if a Πs is elected in a round depends on his account
(public key) and some auxiliary inputs. If a malicious players can choose and register a
biased key after he collects all of the information of the environment, he may get some
advantage to be elected. We call this type of malicious players as adaptive malicious
players and this attack strategy as adaptive key generation attack.
First we will show that adaptive key generation attack will take effect on pure proof
of stake blockchain scheme under some assumption.
Lemma 9. Let Π be any pure proof stake blockchain scheme. The player election function
is F (·, pk). Let p be the probability that a malicious player is elected in a round if there is
no adaptive key generation attack. That is Pr[F (·, pk) = 1] = p for any pk. Let pa be the
probability that a malicious player is elected in a round with adaptive key generation attack.
If F (·, pk) can be predicted by players and the key registration procedure doesn’t affect the
input of F (·, pk) , we have pa = 1 − (1 − p)ploy(κ) .
Proof. For adaptive malicious players, he can generate ploy(κ) different public keys in a
round. He will predict F (·, pk) for all of the ploy(κ) public keys. The probability that all
of the ploy(κ) keys are not be elected is (1 − p)ploy(κ) . We have pa = 1 − (1 − p)ploy(κ) .
He then register the elected key if there is one.
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Our 2hop blockchain is immune to adaptive key generation attack. The intuition is in
our stake election function is F (·, pk), key registration procedure will affect the input ·. In
our scheme, the concrete input · will contain the output of PoW block. The key registration
transaction will be included in the previous PoW blocks. If the malicious players want to
register a key adaptively, he must try PoW which will still consume the computing power.
Lemma 10. Consider the execution EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z . Let β, β̃ > 0. We assume that the
malicious players will take adaptive key generation strategy. Let γ̃ be the expected number
of PoW blocks which are mapped to malicious stakes that malicious players can find in round.
We have γ̃ = β β̃.
Proof. In our scheme, when a valid PoW block is generated, all of the public key of stake
holders are fixed in the previous blocks. Any change of public key (registration of new
public key) will make the PoW block be invalid. If the malicious players take adaptive
strategy, he must redo the PoW hash puzzle. That is adaptive strategy will not bring
advantage to the malicious players comparing with the original strategy. We have γ̃ =
β β̃.
That is in our protocol the key registration will affect the input of PoW block, the malicious players can not take adaptive strategy. How ever in pure proof of stake blockchain
scheme, the key registration is almost free, the malicious players may can register key
adaptively. In order to avoid this attack, there must be some extra assumption in PoS
blockchain, such as a key must have been registered several rounds before it can be
elected.
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4.2.6

Achieving the chain growth property

We here demonstrate that our protocol satisfies the chain growth property for
PoS-chain (Definition 10). The concrete statement to be proved can be found in Theorem 3. We first prove that our blockchain protocol achieves the chain growth property in
the execution HYBr (σ) before moving to the main theorem.
Lemma 11. Consider the execution HYBr (σ). For any δ > 0, during any t consecutive
rounds after round r, the number of honest successful rounds is (1 − δ)γ̂t with probability at
least 1 − e−Ω(t) .
Proof. We will prove that honest stake successful rounds will happen following the honest
collective resources. From Lemma 7, in any t consecutive rounds, the number of honest
stake successful rounds is γ̂t on average. Let X be the number of honest stake successful
rounds in the t consecutive rounds. By Chernoff bound, we have Pr[X ≤ (1 − δ)γ̂t] ≤
e−δ

2 γ̂t/2

.

Thus, Pr[X > (1 − δ)γ̂t] > 1 − e−δ

2 γ̂t/2

= 1 − e−Ω(t) .

The honest stake successful rounds will increase the length of the PoS-chain of best
public chain-pair.
Lemma 12. Consider the execution HYBr (σ). For any δ > 0, and for any honest PoS-holder
S with the best PoS-chain C˜r and C˜r0 in round r and r0 , respectively, where t = r0 − r  ∆,
the probability that len(C˜r0 ) − len(C˜r ) ≥ g ·t where g = (1 − δ)γ̂ is at least 1 − e−Ω(t) .
Proof. For S is honest, C˜r will be received by all honest players no later than round r + ∆.
We have len(C˜r ) ≤ len(viewr+∆ ). For t  ∆, we consider t ≈ t − ∆ for simplicity.
From Lemma 11, in any t consecutive rounds the number of honest successful round is
more than (1 − δ)γt with the probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) . Together with Lemma 8 and
Corollary 7, we have len(viewr0 ) − len(viewr+∆ ) ≥ (1 − δ)γ̂t.
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Chain C˜r0 is the best valid PoS-chain accepted by the honest PoS-holder Sj at round
r0 . We have len(C˜r0 ) ≥ len(viewr0 ). Put them together, len(C˜r0 ) − len(C˜r ) ≥ len(viewr0 ) −
len(viewr+∆ ) ≥ (1 − δ)γ̂t with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) . The corresponding growth
rate is g = (1 − δ)γ̂.
Reminder of Theorem 3. Consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest
PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } with the local PoS-chain C˜ in round r and C˜0 in round r0
˜ ≥ g · t is at
where t = r0 − r > 0, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that len(C˜0 ) − len(C)
least 1 − e−Ω(t) where g = (1 − δ)γ̂.
0
to denote the
Proof. In order to distinguish the notation clearly, we use C˜∆ and C˜∆

PoS-chains of the best chain-pairs of S at round r ans r0 in the execution of HYBr (σ).
0
) ≥ len(C˜∆ ) + g · t] ≥ 1 − e−Ω(t) where t = r0 − r,
From Lemma 12, we have Pr[len(C˜∆

in HYBr (σ).
We now turn to the chain growth property in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z . From the definition
of hybrid execution, we know that all honest players have same initial status at round r.
˜ = len(C˜∆ ).
We have len(C)
0
By Lemma 6, we have len(C˜0 ) ≥ len(C˜∆
).

It follows that,
˜ + g · t]
Pr[len(C˜0 ) ≥ len(C)
0
≥ Pr[len(C˜∆
) ≥ len(C˜∆ ) + g · t]

≥ 1 − e−Ω(t)
where g = (1 − δ)γ̂. This completes the proof.
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(4.1)

4.2.7

Achieving the chain quality property

The chain-quality property (Definition 12) ensures that the rate of honest input contributions in a continuous part of an honest party’s chain has a lower bound. We then
find the lower bound of the number of PoS-blocks produced by the honest players. We
further show that the number of blocks produced by the adversarial miners is bounded
by their collective resources. Finally, we demonstrate that the ratio of honest PoS-blocks
in an honest player’s PoS-chain is under a suitable lower bound in a sufficient number of
rounds with an overwhelming probability.
First, we will build the relationship between length of a chain and the number of
rounds.
Lemma 13. Consider in REAL(σ). For any δ > 0, let Z be the number of rounds which
generate ` blocks, we then have Pr[Z > c`] > 1 − e−Ω(`) , where c  1.
Proof. Putting all of the resources together, all players can generate α̂ + β̂ PoS-blocks in a
round on average. In order to generate ` blocks, it will consume
Let c =

1
,
α̂+β̂

`
α̂+β̂

rounds on average.

and Z be the number of rounds which generate ` PoS-blocks. For

any δ > 0, by using Chernoff bounds, we have Pr[Z ≤ (1 − δ)c`] ≤ e−δ
Pr[Z > (1 − δ)c`] > 1 − e−δ

2 c`/3

2 c`/3

. That is,

= 1 − e−Ω(`) . This completes the proof.

Now we consider the contribution of PoS-blocks from honest players in some consecutive rounds. If the adversarial players want to contribute more PoS-blocks on the chain,
they will try to generate more PoS-blocks and beat the PoS-blocks from honest players in
the competition. Thus, the worst case is the adversarial players make use of all the computing power from both honest and malicious miners to generate PoS-blocks and win all
of the competition. We recall the 4 cases in Section 4.2.2. The adversarial players can
make use of Case 2 and Case 3 to generate PoS-blocks. The honest players will use Case
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1 to generate PoS-blocks. First, we will prove the chain quality property in t consecutive
rounds.
Lemma 14. Consider in REAL(σ) and consider ` PoS-blocks of C˜ that are generated in
consecutive rounds from r to r + t. We assume γ̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ where λ̂ > 1 and any δ > 0.
˜ we have Pr[µ ≥ 1 − (1 + δ) (α+β)β̃ ] >
Then for any honest PoS-holder S with PoS-chain C,
γ̂
˜
1 − e−Ω(t) , for any δ > 0, where µ is the ratio of honest blocks the PoS-chain C.
Proof. Consider ` consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ that are generated from round r to round
r + t. From Theorem 3, we have Pr[` ≥ (1 − δ ∗ )γ̂ · t] ≥ 1 − e−Ω(t) for some δ ∗ > 0.
Let Y be the number of valid malicious PoW-blocks which are actually generated in
t rounds in the Case 2. By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[Y < (1 + δ 0 )β β̃ · t] > 1 − e−Ω(t)
Furthermore, let Z be the number of blocks of generated in Case 3 in t rounds. By
Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[Z < (1 + δ 00 )αβ̃ · t] > 1 − e−Ω(t)
Putting them together, the malicious parties will contribute at most (Y + Z)
PoS-blocks in the t rounds. We then have

`−Y −Z
> 1 − e−Ω(t)
Pr µ ≥
`


That is, By picking δ ∗ , δ 0 , and δ 00 sufficiently small, we have
"

(α + β)β̃
Pr µ ≥ 1 − (1 + δ)
γ̂

#
> 1 − e−Ω(t)

for any δ > 0. This completes the proof.
Now we are ready to prove the chain quality property for consecutive blocks on a
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chain.
Reminder of Theorem 4. We assume γ̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1. Consider protocol Π =
(Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. For any honest PoS-holder S ∈ {Sn+1 , . . . , Sn+ñ } with PoS-chain C˜
in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that, for large enough ` consecutive PoS-blocks of C˜ which
β̃
is
are generated in s rounds, the ratio of honest blocks is no less than µ = 1 − (1 + δ) (α+β)
γ̂

at least 1 − e−Ω(`) .
Proof. Let t be the rounds that the ` blocks are generated. From Lemma 13, we have
Pr[t > c`] > 1 − e−Ω(`) .
From Lemma 14, the ratio of honest PoS-blocks in t consecutive rounds with `
β̃
PoS-blocks is µ ≥ 1 − (1 + δ) (α+β)
with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) .
γ̂

Putting them together, the probability is at least 1 − e−Ω(`) . This completes the proof.

4.2.8

Achieving the common prefix property

We now turn our attention to proving the common prefix property for PoS-chain
(Definition 11) for the proposed protocol. The concrete statement can be found in Theorem 5.
Now we will give some informal proof ideas before the formal proof.
• First, from the assumption, we know that if the malicious parties do not get any
help from the honest parties, then they cannot produce PoS-blocks faster than the
honest parties. That means if the malicious parties keep a forked chain-pair hidden
and try to extend it by themselves, then the growth rate of the hidden chain-pair
is smaller than the growth rate of the public longest chain-pair on average. When
considering an extended period of time, the hidden chain-pair will be shorter than
the public chain-pair with an overwhelming probability.
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• Second, we assume there is no new block being generated in most rounds. This implies no new chain will lead the honest players take divergent view in most rounds.
The honest players will try to be convergent after some silent rounds. If the adversary players want to keep them be divergent, they must send new blocks in silent
rounds. The adversary players don’t have enough resources to do that.
Recall the definition of best public PoS-chain. Best public chain C˜ is: a) C˜ has been
received by all of the honest players which means public. b) C˜ is the best one among all
of the public chains. This implies each honest player will not take any chain worse than
best public chain in any round . Next we will prove, it the adversary players hide some
blocks for a chain, the hidden chain will be worse than the best public chain with high
probability if the hidden length is long. This lemma imply that is the adversary players
keep some blocks privacy, they will be invalid soon. So the adversarial players cannot
store a lot of hidden blocks to destroy the best PoS-chain later.
Lemma 15. Let γ̂ = λ̂β̂ and λ̂ > 1. For any δ > 0, consider the execution REAL(σ). Let
C˜ be the PoS-chain of the best public chain-pair in round r. Let C˜0 be the PoS-chain of a
hidden valid chain-pair in round r. Let ` be the length of the hidden part of C˜0 . We have
˜ > len(C˜0 )] > 1 − eΩ(`) .
Pr[len(C)
Proof. Let round s = r − t be the round that last public block in C˜0 is generated . From
Lemma 13, ` hidden blocks need t rounds to generate with probability at least 1 − eΩ(`) .
That is, Pr[t > c`] > 1 − eΩ(`) .
The hidden blocks are contributed by adversarial players only, otherwise they are not
hidden. Thus, the growth of hidden blocks is from the Case 2. In t rounds, the adversarial
players can generate β̂t PoS-blocks on average. Let X be the number of adversarial blocks
generated in t rounds, by Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[X > (1 + δ)β̂t] < e−Ω(t)
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From Theorem 3, during t rounds the best public PoS-chain will increase Y > (1 −
δ)γ̂t blocks with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) . For γ̂ = λ̂β̂, we have
Pr[X < Y ] > 1 − e−Ω(t) = 1 − eΩ(`)
We denote chain C˜0 at round s as C˜0s . We have
˜ > len(C˜0s ) + Y > len(C˜0s ) + X > len(C˜0 )
len(C)
with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(`) .

We first prove the common prefix property for any t consecutive rounds. The proof
intuition is as follows:
• We assume α + β  1, that means in most rounds, players will not generate block.
• If only honest players broadcast a new PoW-block, in 2∆ silent rounds, all honest
players will take the same best chain-pair (or PoS-chain), unless adversarial players
send new valid blocks.
• If (α + β)∆  1, there are no new messages being broadcast in most rounds.
• From a round, the honest players will often have opportunities to take unique best
chain-pair (or PoS-chain). If the adversarial players want to keep them divergent,
they must broadcast new valid blocks for every opportunity.
• We will prove the adversarial players don’t have enough resource to do that under
our reasonable assumption.
Lemma 16. Let α̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ , λ̂ > 1, (α + β)∆  1. Assume 0 < δ, δ 0 , δ 00 , δ 000 < 1,
consider the execution REAL(σ). Except with probability e−Ω(t) , there does not exist round
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0
r ≤ r0 and PoS-holders Si , Sj such that Si is honest at r, Sj is honest at r0 and C˜ir and C˜jr

diverge at round s = r − t.
Proof. For each round k, we define a random variable Xk . If round k is both pure successful round and silent round, and round k + 2∆ is also a silent round Xk = 1, otherwise
P
Xk = 0. Let X = Xk .
Let X 0 be the number of pure successful rounds in t round. By Lemma 3, X 0 is
(α − α2 )t on average. By Chernoff bound, we have
Pr[X 0 < (1 − δ)(α − α2 )t] < e−Ω(t)
Let X 00 be the number rounds which are both pure successful round and silent round.
A round is pure successful round is independent with the event it is silent round. By
Lemma 5, we have
Pr[X 00 < (1 − δ)(α − α2 )t(1 − 2(1 + δ 0 )(α + β)∆)] < e−Ω(t)
For (α + β)∆  1 and α  1, ∃δ 00 s.t.
Pr[X 00 < (1 − δ 00 )αt] < e−Ω(t)
A round k is also independent with the event round k + 2∆ is a silent round. Also
by Lemma 5, we have
Pr[X < (1 − δ 000 )αt] < e−Ω(t)
If Xk = 1, the new generated block in round k will be mapped to an honest stakeholder with the probability α̃. We use a random variable Yk for round k. If Xk = 1 and
the new generated block is mapped to an honest stakeholder Yk = 1, otherwise Yk = 0.
P
Let Y = Yk . We have
Pr[Y < (1 − δ 000 )αα̃t] < e−Ω(t)
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If Yk = 1 all honest players will be convergent to a unique PoS-chain unless adversarial players send a new block in the next 2∆ rounds. This is because, a) at round r all
honest players have the best PoS-chain with same length. b) at round r the new extended
PoS-block will increase the best public PoS-chain by 1 block. If there is no adversarial
players send a new chain C˜0 with at least the same length, all honest parties will receive
the new PoS-chain in 2∆ rounds and take it as the best chain. The last block of C˜0 must
be generated by adversarial players because if is longer than the best public PoS-chain of
honest players.
Let Z 0 be the number of blocks generated by adversarial players in t consecutive
rounds. We have Z 0 = (α + β)β̃t on average. By Chernoff bound, we have Pr[Z 0 >
(1 + δ)(α + β)β̃t] < e−Ω(t) . From Lemma 15, before round s, the adversarial players
can hide at most κ blocks with an overwhelming probability in κ. Let Z = Z 0 + κ, the
adversarial players can use Z new blocks to prevent the Y convergence opportunities. If
t is large enough, we can have δ 0 that Pr[Z > (1 + δ 0 )(α + β)β̃t] < e−Ω(t) .
Putting them together, Y > (1 − δ 000 )αα̃t and Z < (1 + δ 0 )(α + β)β̃t with probability
at least 1 − e−Ω(t) . By the assumption αα̃ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1, we have
Y − Z > (1 − δ 000 )αα̃t − (1 + δ 0 )(α + β)β̃t

(4.2)

= ((1 − δ 000 )λ̂ − (1 + δ 0 ))(α + β)β̃t
> 0
This implies that the adversarial players cannot prevent the best chain-pair (or
PoS-chain) being convergent during the t consecutive rounds with probability at least
0
1 − e−Ω(t) . If at round r, C˜ir and C˜jr are not divergent, then C˜ir and C˜jr are not divergent.
0
We have C˜ir and C˜jr diverge with the probability at most e−Ω(t) .

We are now ready to prove the main theorem which asserts that our protocol achieves
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the common-prefix property with an overwhelming probability in the security parameter
κ. The theorem is formally given as follows.
Reminder of Theorem 5. We assume α̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1. For any δ > 0,
consider protocol Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any
two honest PoS-holders Si in round r and Sj in round r0 , with the local best PoS-chains C˜i , C˜j ,
respectively, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z where r ≤ r0 and i, j ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n + ñ}, the probability
that C˜i [1, `i ]  C˜j where `i = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) is at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
Proof. From Lemma 16, the probability that C˜i and C˜j diverge at round s = r − t is at most
e−Ω(t) .
In t consecutive rounds, the total number of PoS-blocks are produced is bounded by
(1 + δ)(α + β)(α̃ + β̃)t with probability at least 1 − e−Ω(t) . Let t =

κ
.
(1+δ)(α+β)(α̃+β̃)

We

have C˜i is prefix of C˜j except the last κ blocks with the probability at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
4.2.9

Achieving the chain soundness property

The chain soundness property will guarantee that a new spawned player can take the
best chain properly when he join the system. It is critical to achieve a open blockchain
system. The concrete statement can be found in Theorem 6.
Reminder of Theorem 6. We assume α̂ = λ̂(α + β)β̃ and λ̂ > 1. Consider protocol
Π = (Πw , Πs ) in Section 4.1.2. Let κ be the security parameter. For any new spawned
honest player PoS-holder Si and any existing honest player Sj in round r, with the local best
PoS-chains C˜i , C˜j , respectively, in EXEC(Πw ,Πs ),A,Z , the probability that C˜i [1, `]  C˜j and
C˜j [1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) is at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
Proof. We note that Sj is an honest existing player, Si must receive C˜j in round r. Because
Si take C˜i as best chain we have len(C˜i ) ≥ len(C˜j ).
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Consider the scenario that the adversary let another existing player Sm also take C˜j
as the best chain and then send Ci to Sm . Now, Sm will take C˜j as the best chain.
If C˜i [1, `]  C˜j or C˜j [1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) then the common prefix
property of Si and Sm will be broken. From the Theorem 6 we have that the probability
C˜i [1, `]  C˜j and C˜j [1, `]  C˜i where ` = len(C˜i ) − Θ(κ) is at least 1 − e−Ω(κ) .
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CHAPTER 5

PRACTICAL POW/POS SYSTEM: TWINSCOIN

In this chapter, we design TwinsCoin—a practical improvement of the 2-hop blockchain.
This is the first cryptocurrency based on a provably secure and scalable public blockchain
design using both proof-of-work and proof-of-stake mechanisms from 2-hop blockchain.
The blockchain in our system is more robust than that in a pure proof-of-work based
system; even if the adversary controls the majority of mining power, we can still have the
chance to secure the system by relying on honest stake.
5.1

From 2-hop blockchain to TwinsCoin
Our 2-hop blockchain in Chapter 4 design the first provably secure and scalable open

blockchain, called “2-hop blockchain”, via combining proof-of-work and proof-of-stake.
In their design, in addition to PoW-miners, a new type of players, PoS-holders (stakeholders) are introduced. A winning PoW-miner cannot extend the blockchain immediately as
in Bitcoin. Instead, the winning PoW-miner provides a base which enables a PoS-holder to
be “selected” to extend the blockchain. That is, a PoW-miner and then a PoS-holder jointly
extend the blockchain with a new block. Note that, in Bitcoin, winning PoW-miners directly extend the blockchain.
In the 2-hop blockchain protocol PoW-chains and PoS-chains are plaited together in
every time step, and these PoW/PoS-chains are extended alternately. Intuitively, the 2-hop
blockchain can be viewed as a proof-of-stake scheme which uses a proof-of-work chain
as a biased random beacon. This critical idea enables the 2-hop scheme to achieve almost
the same efficiency as the original Bitcoin scheme. Also, the 2-hop blockchain can scale
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to a large size of network.
Unfortunately, 2-hop blockchain, as it is, has a significant weakness: the resulting
blockchain protocols are expected to be executed in the static protocol execution environments. That is, in each round, the invested/involved physical computing resources as
well as virtual resources (i.e., stake/coins) in the system are always the same. This does
not reflect the reality. Take Bitcoin as an example. In the past years, the amount of computing resources that invested for each unit of time period has increased dramatically. In
Bitcoin, Nakamoto creatively introduced the difficulty adjustment mechanism to address
this issue. By setting a target of extending the blockchain with a new block in each 10
minutes, and by measuring the total time for extending a fixed number (e.g., 2016) of
blocks, each miner can be aware if more computing power has been invested. If so, then
each miner will increase the difficulty, and vice versa. Unfortunately, adaptive difficulty
adjustment mechanism is missing in the 2-hop blockchain. We remark that blockchains
without adaptive difficulty adjustment mechanism can often be easily broken. Nevertheless, the provably secure, and scalable 2-hop blockchain can serve as a good starting point
for us to achieve our research goal.
Adaptive difficulty adjustment. In our TwinsCoin system design, we need to make
our blockchain protocols to be adaptive to the protocol execution environments. Note
that here we have to address two types of resources, computing power and stake. It seems
that we need to measure the system through two different ways. However, in the original 2-hop design, the total number of proof-of-work blocks (PoW-blocks) is equal to the
total number of proof-of-stake blocks (PoS-blocks). It is not clear how to use Nakamoto’s
difficulty adjustment mechanism directly for our purpose.
In order to address this issue, we change the blockchain structure.

Our new

blockchain structure allow us to “measure” the system thru two different ways. Now
we record more PoW-blocks, called attempting proof-of-work blocks; these blocks are gen83

erated due to a successful first hop, but a failure second hop. For the sake of presentation,
we call PoW-blocks successful if they are generated due to a successful first hop along
with a successful second hop. Once we have two types of PoW-blocks, we can measure
the ratio between these two types of PoW-blocks. This idea eventually allows us to design
a new difficulty adjustment mechanism.
Moving the underlying blockchain to the non-flat setting. In the original 2-hop
blockchain design [DFZ16], the resulting blockchain protocols are expected to be executed in the idealized flat-model. Note that, in the flat model, each proof-of-work miner
holds the same amount of computing power and each proof-of-stake holder has the same
amount of stake (i.e., coins). Apparently, this flat model does not reflect the reality. Strictly
sticking to the flat model will only allow us to design non-practical blockchains.
Blockchain is the core component of our TwinsCoin system. Note that, the designed
and then implemented blockchain in this paper essentially consists of two parts, the PoWchain, and the PoS-chain, and they always go along together, like twins, and we coin our
system as TwinsCoin.
Light client design. We propose a way to make light clients possible in a proof-ofstake setting. As far as we know this is the first concrete proposal backed by a practical
evaluation.
5.2

Twinscoin design
Starting with a provably secure “core”, the 2-hop blockchain [DFZ16], we develop

our TwinsCoin system by following the steps below.
First, we redesign the structure of the 2-hop blockchain in [DFZ16] with the goal of
enabling a new mechanism for adjusting difficulties. We call this a modified 2-hop
blockchain. Please see Section 5.2.1.
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Second, based on the modified 2-hop blockchain, we introduce a new mechanism to
adjust the difficulties for both PoW and PoS chains. Please see Section 5.2.2.
In addition, from a different angle, we extend the 2-hop blockchain to the non-flat setting where stakeholders may have different amounts of stake. Please see Section 5.2.3
for details.
By combining these above steps, we have the blockchain for our TwinsCoin. This new
blockchain is in the non-flat model with adaptive difficulty adjustment.
Finally, we enhance the TwinsCoin system with light clients. Please see Section 5.2.4.
5.2.1

Our modified 2-hop blockchain

We summarize the frequently used notations in Table 1.
Table 1.: Table of notations
Notation

Description

κ
Cinit
B, C
B̃, C˜
B
˜
hC, Ci
C
X
Σ

security parameter.
an initial blockchain.
a PoW-block, a PoW-chain.
a PoS-block, a PoS-chain
a set of proof-of-work blocks
a chain-pair
a set of chain-pairs.
information stored in blockchain.
unique digital signature scheme Σ =
(Gen, Sign, Verify).
Σ0
digital signature scheme Σ0
=
0
0
0
(Gen , Sign , Verify ).
(sk, vk)
a unique signing and verification key-pair
(sk0 , vk0 )
an ordinary signing and verification key-pair
Broadcast(·) unauthenticated send-to-all functionality.

We suppose that there exists an initial blockchain Cinit as the starting point, and Cinit is
known to all participants. Now we present the behaviors of PoW-miners and PoS-holders
in our system.
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Miners. Initially, each PoW-miner sets the set of chain-pairs C to empty. This procedure
is formally presented by Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Main Protocol: PoW-miner.
1

C ← ;

2

while True do

3

C ← all chain-pairs received from the network.

4

˜ ← BestValid(C); Cnew , ← PoW(hC, Ci)
˜
hC, Ci

5

if C 6= Cnew then
˜ Broadcast(hC, Ci)
˜
C ← Cnew ; C ← C ∪ hC, Ci;

6

Stakeholders. The initialization of every PoS-holder is the same as PoW-miners except
that each valid PoS-holder is parameterized by a unique pair of signing and verification
keys (sk, vk) , a ordinary key-pair (sk0 , vk0 ) , and amount of coins v . (In this appendix, the
blockchain protocol is described in the flat model, and we assume v = 1.) This procedure
is formally presented by Algorithm 2.
5.2.1.1

Proof-of-Work Blockchain

Attempting and Successful Blocks Besides PoS-blocks and PoW-blocks, our modified
blockchain specifies two types of PoW-blocks: attempting blocks and successful blocks with
respect to the local view of each player in the system. If a node receives a new PoW-block
without a corresponding PoS-block, the PoW-block becomes an attempting block with
respect to the view of the player. In opposite, if a node receives a new PoW-block along
with a corresponding PoS-block, the PoW-block is now considered as a successful block in
the node’s local view.
We now present the blockchain structure in our modified 2-hop blockchain. Please
also see Figure 13.
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Algorithm 2: Main Protocol: PoS-holder. The PoS-holder algorithm is parameterized
by two key-pairs (sk, vk) for the unique signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign, Verify) and
(sk0 , vk0 ) for the ordinary signature scheme Σ0 = (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ).
1

C ← ;

2

while True do

3

C ← all chain-pairs received from the network.

4

X ← all payloads received from the network.

5

˜ ← BestValid(C); C˜new ← PoS(sk, vk, sk0 , vk0 , X , hC, Ci)
˜
hC, Ci

6

if C˜ 6= C˜new then
˜ Broadcast(hC, Ci)
˜
C˜ ← C˜new ; C ← C ∪ hC, Ci;

7

Proof-of-Work Block Structure Let H(·), G(·) be cryptographic hash functions with
output in {0, 1}κ where κ is the security parameter. As introduced, we have two different
types of PoW-blocks: attempting blocks and successful blocks. The structure of attempting
and successful blocks are the same. However, they have different meaning as follows: (1)
no PoS-block links to an attempting block, and (2) we only count the successful blocks
when calculating the real length of a proof-of-work chain. A PoW-block B is a tuple of
the form hctr, hw , hs , ha , ωi, where
Notation ctr denotes a positive integer, 1 ≤ ctr ≤ q, and q ∈ N is the maximum
number of random oracle queries from each player per unit of time,
Notation hw denotes the digest of the previous proof-of-work block, where hw ∈
{0, 1}κ ,
Notation hs denotes the digest of the previous proof-of-stake block, where hs ∈
{0, 1}κ ,
Notation ha denotes the digest of the latest seen attempting proof-of-work block,
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1
B2

1
B3

B32

2
B2
3
B2

...

B−1

B0

3
B3

B3

B2

B1

B̃1

B̃2

...

...
time

Fig. 13.: A modified 2-hop blockchain structure
Here, dot arrows (that link to the previous successful block and attempting blocks) denote the first
hops, and solid arrows denote the second hops. Green blocks Bi ’s denote the successful proofof-work blocks, Bij ’s denote the attempting proof-of-work blocks, and red blocks B̃i ’s denote the
corresponding proof-of-stake blocks. Note that the blue blocks are from the “mature blockchain”.

where ha ∈ {0, 1}κ
Notation ω is a random nonce, where ω ∈ {0, 1}κ , and block B satisfies the inequality
H(ctr, G(hw , hs , ha , ω)) < T where the parameters T ∈ N denotes the current proof-ofwork target of the block.
A PoW-chain C consists of a sequence of ` concatenated successful PoW-blocks. We denote
head(C) as to the topmost successful PoW-block B` in blockchain C. That is, we do not
consider an attempting block as the head of the proof-of-work chain, and the head of a
PoW-chain is not necessary the topmost PoW-block since the topmost PoW-block could be
an attempting block. Moreover, we only link a new proof-of-work block to the head of the
proof-of-work chain. This implies that there may be multiple attempting blocks attaching
to a successful block in our proof-of-work chain. If a chain C is a prefix of another chain
C 0 , we write C  C 0 .
Extending a Proof-of-Work Blockchain Miners maintain our system by extending the
PoW-chain. Algorithm 3 formally describes how to extend a proof-of-work blockchain in
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our system. This algorithm is parameterized by hash functions H(·), G(·) as well as two
positive integers q, T where q is the maximum number of random oracle queries of each
PoW-miner per unit of time, and T determines the “current block target” of the PoW. The
˜ the algorithm computes the hash
algorithm works as follows: given a chain-pair hC, Ci,
hw of the previous PoW-block (the head of the PoW-chain), the hash hs of the head of
the PoS-chain, and the hash ha of the latest attempting block collected. We emphasize
that, the head of the PoW-chain is the “most recent successful block” on the chain (not an
attempting block), and without connecting to the head of the current PoS-chain or the latest attempting block, the adversary can rewrite any information stored on the chain-pair.
The algorithm then samples a random initial string ω of length κ, then it increments ctr
and checks if H(ctr, G(hw , hs , ha , ω)) < T; if a suitable (ctr, hw , hs , ha , ω) is found then the
algorithm succeeds in solving the PoW and extends blockchain C by one block.
We illustrate the high level idea as in Figure 14. In this figure, we consider a
PoW-miner attempting to mine from a valid block-pair consisting of a PoW-block B and a
PoS-block B̃. There, in the first attempt, a new PoW-block B21 is linked to B (by the hash
hw of B) and to B̃ (by the hash hs of B̃); however, the corresponding PoS-block of B21 is
not seen by the PoW-miner. Therefore, we say B21 is an attempting PoW-block. In the second attempt, a new PoW-block B22 is produced without any corresponding PoS-block, this
block also becomes an attempting block. In the third attempt, a new successful PoW-block
with the corresponding PoS-block is attached to the chain.
5.2.1.2

Proof-of-Stake Blockchain

In our system, a digital signature scheme is used by stakeholders to create new valid
PoS-blocks. Let H(·) be a cryptographic hash function with output in {0, 1}κ where κ
is the security parameter. We now introduce the format of a PoS-block. Consider each
PoS player holds two pairs of keys (vk, sk) and (vk0 , sk0 ) for digital signature schemes
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Algorithm 3: The proof-of-work function, parameterized by positive integers q, T and
hash functions H(·), G(·). )
1

˜
function PoW(hC, Ci)

2

Let B be a set of attempting blocks that attach to head(C)

3

Let l be the number of attempting blocks in B.

4

˜ ctr ← 1;
Set ha :=⊥ if B is empty;hw := H(head(C)) hs := H(head(C));
ω ← {0, 1}κ ; B ← 

5
6

if l 6= 0 then
Let B l be the latest PoW-block found B that attaches to head(C);
ha ← H(B l )

7
8
9
10
11

while ctr ≤ q do
if (H(ctr, G(hw , hs , ha , ω)) < T) ∧ (ctr ≤ q) then
B ← hctr, hw , hs , ha , ωi; C ← CB
ctr ← ctr + 1
return C ;

/*
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Return the updated chain

*/

1
B2

1
B2

1
B2

B22

hw

B22

ha

B1

hs

B̃1

B̃1

B̃1
First Attempt

B2

B1

B1

Second Attempt

B̃2

Successful Attempt

Fig. 14.: Generating new PoW-blocks
(Gen, Sign, Verify) and (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ), respectively. Note that (Gen, Sign, Verify) is
a unique digital signature scheme [Lys02], while (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ) can be an ordinary
digital signature scheme.
In our system, each valid PoS-block is coupled with a valid PoW-block. Based on
a given PoW-block B, any stakeholder whose verification key vk satisfies the following
hash inequality H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃ is allowed to generate a new PoS block, where T̃ is the
current proof-of-stake target, hw is the hash value of B and ω̃ ← Signsk (B).
Then a new PoS-block B̃ is in the form B̃ = h(B, ω̃, vk), X , σ, vk0 i, where X ∈
{0, 1}∗ is the payload of the proof-of-stake block B̃ (also denoted as payload(B̃)); and
σ is produced by the PoS player but by using a different signing key sk0 , i.e., σ ←
Sign0sk0 ((B, ω̃, vk), X ).
˜ as the topmost PoS-block of the proof-of-stake chain C.
˜ We note
We define head(C)
˜ to denote the information
that, in PoS-chain, payload is stored, and we use payload(C)
˜ If ` is the total number of PoS-blocks in the PoS-chain C,
˜ then we have
we store in C.
˜ = ||` payload(B̃i ), where || means concatenation.
payload(C)
i=1
Extending a Proof-of-Stake Blockchain. In Algorithm 4, we describe how the stakeholders extend PoS-chains. In more details, Algorithm 4 processes as follows. Upon re-
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˜ the algorithm attempts to extend the specified
ceiving message (sk, vk, sk0 , vk0 , X , hC, Ci),
˜ The algorithm then executes the following steps:
PoS-chain C˜ in the chain-pair hC, Ci;
Step 1—Leader Election. The algorithm collects all attempting blocks that link to the head
of C. We denote the set of these attempting blocks as B, and denote l as the number
of blocks in B; here, l = 0 means this set is empty and there are no attempting blocks
that follow head(C). Then, let B be the latest attempting block in B. If B is not empty
meaning that there exits a block B, the algorithm checks if the verification key vk is a valid
key (owns the stake) and the inequality H(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃ holds, where ω̃ ← Signsk (B) and
hw := H(B). If yes, the PoS-holder with the key-pair (sk, vk) is the winning PoS-holder.
Step 2—Signature generation. After Step 1 the PoS-holder with signing and verification
keys (sk, vk) is the winning PoS-holder. The algorithm then generates a signature σ ←
Sign0sk0 ((B, ω̃, vk), X ) using the ordinary signature scheme Σ0 with key-pair (sk0 , vk0 ), and
forms a new PoS-block B̃ = h(B, ω̃, vk), X , σ, vk0 i. We say the PoS-holder with the key
pair (sk, vk) extends the specified PoS-chain C˜ with B̃.
The Figure 15 illustrate the structure of a chain-pair after executing Algorithm 4.
As shown in the figure, we have B the most recently produced PoW-block, and the new
PoS-block B links to B by storing B in the block.

head(C)

B

˜
head(C)

B̃

Fig. 15.: Generating new PoS-blocks
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Algorithm 4: The proof-of-stake function, parameterized by a unique signature scheme
Σ = (Gen, Sign, Verify), an ordinary signature scheme Σ0 = (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify0 ), a parameter T̃, a function H(·).
1

˜
function PoS(sk, vk, sk0 , vk0 , X , hC, Ci)

2

Let B is the set of all attempting blocks that attach to head(C)

3

Let l be the number of attempting blocks in B

4

Let B be the latest PoW-block in B that attaches to head(C)
/*

If there is one new PoW-block that attaches to head(C).

5

ω̃ := Signsk (B)

6

hw := H(B)

7

if l > 0 then

*/

if (H(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃)) then

8

σ ← Sign0sk0 ((B, ω̃, vk), X )

9

B̃ = h(B, ω̃, vk), X , σ, vk0 i;C˜ ← C˜B̃

10

˜
return C;

11

5.2.1.3

/*

Return the updated chain

*/

Validating a Chain-pair

Chain-Pair validation is the most important process in our design. We first formally
describe the following predicates used in the ValidateChain algorithm.
q,T

Predicate ValidPoWH,G (B, B 0 , B̃, B, B̂). This predicate is parameterized by two integers
q, T, and two hash functions H(·), G(·). The goal of this predicate is to check the validity of a successful PoW-block B upon receiving inputs: the successful block B, another
successful block B 0 , a PoS-block B̃, two sets of attempting PoW-blocks B and B̂. Here, the
block B consists of hctr, hw , hs , ha , ωi, block B 0 consists of hctr0 , hw0 , hs0 , ha0 , ω 0 i, the set B
consists of l attempting blocks {B 1 , . . . , B l } where each block B i = hctri , hwi , hsi , hai , ω i i
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, and the set B̂ consists of l attempting blocks {B̂ 1 , . . . , B̂ l } where each
j

ˆ , ĥwj , ĥsj , ĥbj , ω̂ j i for 1 ≤ j ≤ l. Note that, PoW-blocks in B and B̂ are in
block B̂ j = hctr
temporal-order. The predicate checks the following.
B is properly solved if H(ctr, G(hw , hs , ha , ω)) < T; B links to the previous PoW-block
B 0 if hw = H(B 0 ) ;B links to the previous PoS-block B̃ if hs = H(B̃).
If l > 0, check whether B links to the latest attempting block in the second set B̂ if
ha = H(B̂ l ).
If l > 0, check whether all attempting blocks in B are properly solved if for 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
H(ctri , G(hwi , hsi , hai , ω i )) < T
If l > 0, check whether all attempting blocks B i = hctri , hwi , hsi , hai , ω i i in B̂ are properly linked if
• B i links to the previous PoW-block B 0 if hwi = H(B 0 ).
• B i links to the previous PoS-block B̃ if hsi = H(B̃).
• B i links to the previous attempting block in the set B if hai = H(B i−1 ) (Note that,
we consider B 0 = B 0 .)
The predicate ValidPoWq,T
H,G outputs 1 if and only the examined block B passes all
tests described above.
0

,T̃
Predicate ValidPoSΣ,Σ
(B̃, B). This predicate is parameterized by a uniqe signature
H

scheme Σ, an ordinary signature scheme Σ0 , and an integer T̃, and a hash function H(·).
The goal of this predicate is to check the validity of a PoS-block B̃ = h(B, ω̃, vk), X , σ, vk0 i
upon receiving inputs: a PoS-block B̃, a PoW-block B.
The predicate checks the following
B̃ is generated by an elected PoS-holder if H(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃, where hw = H(B)
B̃ links to the corresponding PoW-block B if B = B 0
The signature σ is properly generated if Verify0vk0 ((B, ω̃, vk), X , σ) = 1
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Algorithm 5: The chain-pair validation algorithm, parameterized by a unique signature
scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign, Verify), an ordinary signature scheme Σ0 = (Gen0 , Sign0 , Verify; ),
the stake-identity set S, parameters q, T, T̃, an initial chain Cinit , the hash functions H(·),
H(·),G(·) and the content validation predicate V (·).
1

˜
function ValidateChain(hC, Ci)

2

˜
b ← V (payload(C))

3

if b = True then

4

repeat

5

˜
B ← H(head(C)); B̃ ← H(head(C))

6

Let B is the set of all attempting PoW-blocks attaching to head(C)

7

Truncate all PoW-blocks from the head of C (including the head), and
truncate the head of C˜
/*

8

obtain new heads

*/

Let B̂ is the set of all attempting PoW-blocks attaching to the
newhead(C)

9

˜
b1 ← ValidPoWq,T
H,G (B, head(C), head(C), B, B̂)
0

10
11
12

,T̃
b2 ← ValidPoSΣ,Σ
(B̃, B); b = b1 ∧ b2
H

until (C = Cinit ) ∨ (b = False);
return b

0

The predicate ValidPoWHΣ,Σ ,T̃ outputs 1 if and only if the examined PoS-block B̃
passes all tests described above.
Our chain-pair validation algorithm, denoted ValidateChain, is introduced to examine
if a pair of chains (including a PoW-chain and a PoS-chain ) is valid. Intuitively, a valid
chain-pair means its members PoW-chain C and PoS-chain C˜ are both valid, respectively.
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Furthermore, each block of the PoS-chain must contain the valid supporting signature for
the corresponding block of the PoW-chain. Please refer to Algorithm 5 for more details.
Resolving fork. In 2-hop blockchain design, fork is resolved by choosing the chainpair with the longest PoW-chain. In our design, a PoW-block could be an attempting
or successful block. Furthermore, successful blocks are much more important than
attempting blocks. Therefore, the winning chain-pair is the one with the most number
of successful blocks, that is, the one that required (in expectancy) the most successful
mining power.
Security. We emphasize that, this section only focuses on the structure of the blockchain.
We slightly modify 2-hop blockchain to construct a more practical cryptocurrency system.
The security proof for this modified version is directly implied from 2-hop blockchain
security.
5.2.2

Blockchain with adjustable difficulty

Nakamoto’s difficulty adjustment for PoW. In Bitcoin, in order to keep the block with
a steady rate, the system adjusts the PoW hash target adaptively. The intuition is that the
lower target means lower probability to get a valid PoW block by calling a hash function.
This intuition provides a method to control the block generation rate by a target adjustment scheme. For some time interval, if the chain extension rate is higher than expected,
the target needs to be decreased to make the successful probability lower.
The target is adjusted every m blocks, In Bitcoin, m = 2016. We define a time period
of m blocks (precisely, difference between timestamps of the last and the first blocks in the
sequence) as an epoch. Let t be the expected time of an epoch. For example, in Bitcoin a
new valid block is to be generated every 10 minutes on average. Then we have t = m × 10
minutes, which is approximately 14 days for an epoch. Let ti be the the actual duration of
the i-th epoch. Let Ti be the target in the i-th epoch. We have the target in the (i + 1)-th
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epoch as follows:
Ti+1 =

ti
Ti
t

(5.1)

From the equation above we can observe that, if ti > t then Ti+1 > Ti and vice-versa. In
the case that ti > t, the miners spend longer time to obtain m blocks in the i-th epoch.
Therefore, the target should be increased so that the miners can find new blocks faster in
the next epoch. This negative feedback mechanism makes the system stable.
Our difficulty adjustment for PoW/PoS. We propose two adaptive target mechanisms
for PoW and PoS chains in order to keep the chain-pair growth with a stable rate. First,
we use T to denote the PoW target in general. We also use Ti as the PoW target in the i-th
epoch. The PoW target is used to control the probability of finding a new valid PoW-block
for each attempt. Secondly, we use T̃ to denote the PoS target in general. We also use T̃i
as the PoS target in the i-th epoch. The PoS target is used to control the probability that
a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a valid stakeholder.
PoS target adjustment. To extend a PoS-chain, a stakeholder uses the inequality
H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃ to test if he is eligible to sign a PoS-block. Here, B is a new PoWblock and vk is the verification key of the stakeholder, and ω̃ is the unique signature of B.
We assume the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to
a stakeholder is V < 1. Suppose there are mi PoW-blocks that are generated in the i-th
epoch, and let T̃i be the PoS difficulty in the i-th epoch, the PoS difficulty in the (i + 1)-th
epoch is defined by the following equation:
T̃i+1 =

mi V
T̃i
m

(5.2)

We interpret the PoS difficulty adjustment by the following. If

mi
V
m

> 1, then the prob-

ability that the PoW-block is mapped to a stakeholder is lower than the expectation V;
therefore, the PoS target T̃i+1 will be increased. Similarly, if
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mi
V
m

< 1, then the probability

that the PoW-block is mapped to a stakeholder is higher than the expectation V; therefore,
the PoS target T̃i+1 will be decreased. It is easy to see this is a negative feedback algorithm
that can ensure that the successful probability is close to V.
PoW target adjustment. The difficulty adjustment strategy for PoW-chain in our system
is similar to the original Bitcoin system except that we additionally consider the influence
of PoS-chain generation to the PoW-chain.
As discussed in Section 5.2.1, in order to generate a valid block a miner need to try
different ω to satisfy a hash inequality, i.e., H(hw , hs , ha , ω) < T. It is easy to see that if we
increase T, the probability to generate a valid PoW-block of one hash query will increase,
and vice versa. We assume the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a
stakeholder is V < 1. The difficulty is adjusted every m PoW-blocks of the chain-pair. We
can take the typical value m = 2016 as in Bitcoin system. We use mi to denote the total
number of attempting (and successful) PoW-blocks that are generated in the i-th epoch. If
some PoW-blocks are not be successfully mapped to stakeholders, we would have mi > m.
Similar to Bitcoin, we also use t to denote the expected time span for an epoch, and ti do
denote the actual time span for the i-th epoch. Let Ti be the target in the i-th epoch. The
target in the (i + 1)-th epoch is defined by
Ti+1 =

mti
Ti
mi tV

(5.3)

The difficulty adjustment for PoW is based on two “factors”, ti and mi . The logic is
as follows:
If ti < t, we know that the i-th epoch is shorter than expected. In this case, we need
to decrease Ti+1 to increase the PoW difficulty in the (i + 1)-th epoch. Similarly, if
ti > t, we need to increase Ti+1 to decrease the PoW difficulty.
If mi > m/V, we know that the probability that PoW-block can be mapped to a stake-
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holder is lower than the expectation V. In this case, the PoS difficulty (see PoS difficulty
adjustment) would be decreased and we need to increase PoW difficulty (by reducing
Ti+1 ). Similarly, if mi < m/V, the PoS difficulty would be increased, then we need to
decrease PoW difficulty (by increasing Ti+1 ).
Potential attack on adjustable difficulty.

Garay et al. [GKL15] and then Pass et

al. [PSS17b] analyze blockchain without considering difficulty adjustment. The difficulty
D is fixed and reflect the probability p that a hash query is a successful query. Together
with the number of players n, p will control the probability that a player finds a valid
solution in a round. Furthermore, they also assume the ratio of honest players ρ which
provides an upper bound on the probability that a round is a successful round. Notation
α is used to denote the probability that some honest player succeeds in solving a puzzle
in one round and β is used to denote the expected number of blocks that an attacker can
mine in a round. they assume α  1 and β  1 to analyze the protocol.
Garay et al. [GKL17] discuss backbone protocol with variable difficulty. They assume
that in any consecutive s rounds the mining power will increase γ times at most. They
study the security properties under this assumption. A potential attack on adjustable
difficulty is that malicious parties may stop to mine new blocks in some rounds. According
to the algorithm, the target D will be decreased to make the successful query easier so
that the system will keep a consistent pace to generate new blocks. The malicious players
then begin to mine new blocks under this difficult target. If the assumption α  1 and
β  1 is broken, then the system would be insecure.
Security analysis on Nakamoto’s. We provide an security analysis to demonstrate that
the malicious players are not able to attack the Nakamoto’s system by taking advantage
of the difficulty adjustment mechanism. Our analysis uses the original security proof in
Garay et al. [GKL15] as a black box. They have proven the backbone protocol will achieve
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chain quality and common prefix properties based on some reasonable assumptions.
We will follow the same assumption and notations as in [GKL15]. Parameter p denotes a probability of that a hash query satisfy the target. The malicious players may
change p by effecting the adjustable difficulty. We will prove the attack will not break
the assumption in [GKL15]. We use the number of rounds to measure the duration time
t instead of the actual time. We also use ti to denote the number of rounds for the i-th
epoch.
Lemma 17. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In
each round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch
and t be the expected rounds for an epoch. Let p be the probability that a hash query satisfies
m
the target. For any constant δ > 1, we have Pr[p ≤ (1 + δ) nqρt
] > 1 − e−Ω(δ) .

Proof. First, we discuss the average case. If the malicious players stop to contribute any
blocks, the epoch would become longer than the expectation. From the equation 5.1, it is
easy to see that the target T would be increased, as well as the parameter p. After some
time, this would reach to a stable status in the i-th epoch, that is Ti+1 = Ti . We get ti = t.
In the i-th epoch, only honest computing power tries to generate new blocks. On average,
the honest miners will generate nqρti p = m blocks in the i-th epoch. For ti = t, we get
nqρtp = m. That is p =

m
.
nqρt

Now, we turn to the worst case. When p ≥

m
,
nqρt

suppose

that in t rounds the honest miners generate m blocks. By Chernoff bound, we have P r[t >
(1 + δ)t] < e−Ω(δ) . From the equation 5.1, we have P r[Ti+1 > (1 + δ)Ti ] < e−Ω(δ) . That
m
m
is Pr[p > (1 + δ) nqρt
] < e−Ω(δ) . We get Pr[p ≤ (1 + δ) nqρt
] > 1 − e−Ω(δ) .

Lemma 18. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In each
round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch and t
be the expected rounds for an epoch. If

m
t

 1, we have α  1 and β  1 with probability

that is no less than 1 − e−Ω(δ) , for any δ > 1.
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Proof. From the definition, we have α ≈ nρqp. From lemma 17, we have α ≤ (1+δ) mt  1
with probability that is greater than or equal to 1 − e−Ω(δ) . We also have β ≈ n(1 − ρ)qp.
From lemma 17, we have β ≤ (1 + δ) m(1−ρ)
 1 with probability that is no less than
tρ
1 − e−Ω(δ) .
We therefore conclude that the malicious players cannot break the assumption by
tuning the target.
Security analysis on TwinsCoin. We here provide security analysis to demonstrate that
the malicious players are not able to attack the TwinsCoin system by taking advantage of
the difficulty adjustment mechanism. In [DFZ16], the authors give a formal security proof
for 2-hop blockchain (without considering difficulty adjustment). There, they assume that
the probability that a PoW block is generated in a round is very low. They also assume the
probability that a PoW block is mapped to a valid stake is much less than 1. A potential
attack is that the malicious players can increase the target to make it is easier to generate
a PoW block, or increase the probability that a PoW block is mapped to a stake.. In this
section we prove that this attack does not work for our modified 2-hop blockchain under
a certain assumption.
The intuition is that in order to increase the target, the malicious players can stop
to contribute new PoW-blocks and PoS-blocks from some moments. This will make the
block extension rate lower. By our difficulty adjustment algorithm, the target will increase
to speed up the block generation. At some later point, the malicious players will begin to
work and sign under the increased target. We will follow the notations in [DFZ16]. We
assume all of the computing power can make n hash queries to generate PoW-blocks in
an epoch. The ratio of honest computing power is ρ. We also assume the total amount of
coins is n̂ and the honest ratio is ρ̂.
Lemma 19. Let V be the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully
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mapped to a stakeholder. Total amount of coins is n̂ and the honest ratio is ρ̂. Let α̃ and β̃
be the probabilities that a PoW-block is mapped to an honest stake and a malicious stake,
respectively. For for any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have α̃ ≤

V
1−δ

and β̃ ≤

1−ρ̃ V
ρ̃ 1−δ

with probability that

m

is no less than 1 − e−Ω(δ V ) .
Proof. First, we discuss the average case. If the malicious players stop sign PoS blocks,
the PoS target T̃ would be increased. When the honest players can sign PoS block with
the expectation probability V, the PoS target will be stable. That is T̃i+1 = T̃i . From
the equation 5.2, we have

m
mi

= V. That is mi =

m
.
V

Now, we turn to the worst case.

When the malicious players stop sign PoS blocks, we have α̃ =

m
mi

= V. with Chernoff

m

bound, for any δ ∈ (0, 1) we have Pr[mi < (1 − δ) m
] < e−Ω(δ V ) . That is Pr[α̃ =
V
V
]
1−δ

m

< e−Ω(δ V ) . The malicious will take the same PoS target, we have Pr[β̃ >

m
mi

>

1−ρ̃ V
]
ρ̃ 1−δ

<

m

e−Ω(δ V ) .
From the Lemma 19, α̃ and β̃ will not break the assumption by difficulty adjustment
with high probability.
Lemma 20. Let V be the expectation of the probability that a PoW-block is successfully
mapped to a stakeholder. Total amount of coins is n̂ and the honest ratio is ρ̂ the malicious
ratio is 1 − ρ̂. Let n be the total number of players and ρ be the ratio of honest players. In
each round, a player can make q hash queries. Let m be the number of blocks for an epoch
and t be the expected rounds for an epoch. If

m
t

 1, we have α  1 and β  1 with

probability that is no less than 1 − e−Ω(δ) .
Proof. From Lemma 19, we have α̃ ≤ V with probability that is greater than or equal to
m

1 − e−Ω( V ) . Putting it together with the equation 5.3, we have Ti+1 ≤ tti Ti with probability
m

that is no less than 1 − e−Ω( V ) . This means the target Ti will be increased no faster than
it is in equation 5.1. We can show the proof in the similar way as in Lemma 18.
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From the Lemma 20, α and β will not break the assumption by difficulty adjustment
with a high probability.
5.2.3

PoS blockchain in the non-flat model

Moving PoS blockchain from the flat to the non-flat model. The (modified) 2-hop
blockchain in section 5.2.1 is described in the flat model with a pre-fixed difficulty parameter. Intuitively, if PoS-holders have different amounts of stake (coins), they would have
different probabilities to be elected. Thus, we improve the construction to be suitable for
non-flat model that means the PoS-holder can keep different amount of stake in an account. Next, we prove that our construction is fair in the non-flat model so a PoS-holder
would not get any advantages if he splits his stake to multiple accounts.
We describe the non-flat model with hash inequality first. For a stakeholder, vk is
his verification key (public key), and sk is the corresponding signing key. To extend
PoS-chain, the stakeholder will choose the best chain-pair with the most “successful” min˜ be the best chain-pair, and C is PoW-chain, C˜ is PoS-chain. If the last
ing power. Let hC, Ci
PoW-block B on chain C is a new block in which there is no corresponding PoS-block on
PoS-chain, then the stakeholder would attempt to generate a new PoS-block as the following: Let T̃ denote the current difficulty target for the PoS-block generation. We assume the
total amount of stake in the whole system is n̂, we also assume the length of the output
of hash function H(·) is κ. Let p =

T̃
,
2κ

we assume n̂p < 1. Let v be the number of coins

in the account of a stakeholder with vk. If the inequality H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < T̃ is satisfied,
the stakeholder with the key-pair (sk, vk) would win a chance to sign the corresponding
PoS-block for PoW-block B. As far as we know this is the first concrete non-flat treatment
for PoS-chain.
Security analysis. We provide here a security analysis for the non-flat model. The players may take more than 1 coin in an account under non-flat model. We will argue that if
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a stakeholder puts more than 1 coin in his account, this would not change the probability
for PoS-block mapping. Intuitively, from our non-flat construction, if a PoS-holder puts
more coins in an account, he has a higher probability to be selected; therefore, he does
not need to split his coins into multiple accounts.
Lemma 21. Let p =

T̃
2κ

and κ is the length of hash output. Let n̂ be the total number of

coins. We assume n̂p < 1. For any stakeholder with account (sk, vk), we assume there are v
coins in this account, where v < n̂. We have Pr[H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < v T̃] = v p.
Proof. From the definition we have v T̃ = v p2κ . For n̂p < 1 and v < n̂, we have v T̃ < 2κ .
Since H(B, vk) produces the output uniformly in (0, 2κ ), we have Pr[H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) < v T̃] =
v p.
From the Lemma 21, we have the probability that a stakeholder is selected to generate
a PoS-block is proportional to the amount of stake he controls.
If the PoS-holder puts his v coins in one account, for any PoW block B, the probability
that he is selected to sign the corresponding PoS block is vp.
If the PoS-holder puts his v coins in v accounts and every account has one coin, for
any PoW-block B, the probability that an account is selected to sign the corresponding
PoS-block is p. The outputs of hash function H̃(hw , ω̃, vk) are independent for different
unque pair (vk, ω̃). The total probability that the PoS-holder is selected is also vp.
That is, the probability a stakeholder is selected in the non-flat model is equal to
the accumulated probability that he distributes the stake to different accounts in the flatmodel. For a PoS-holder, the probability that he is selected only depends on the total
amount of stake (coins) he controls.
We summarize our TwinsCoin design in Figure 16. Starting with the 2-hop blockchain
4, we first propose a slightly modified version (Section 5.2.1) by changing the structure of
the proof-of-work chain as well as the format of proof-of-work blocks. Then we improve
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this modified 2-hop blockchain further, (i) by enabling difficulty adjustment for both PoW
and PoS chains (see Section 5.2.2), and (ii) by introducing an alternative method to choose
stakeholders to extend the PoS chain in the non-flat setting where players may have different amounts of coins. By combining these improvements with light client design, we
complete the blockchain design in our TwinsCoin system.
Chapter
(2-hop)
Sec43.2
Sec 5.2.1 (Modified
2-hop)
4.1
Sec 5.2.34.2
(Non-Flat)

Sec
FSIG5.2.2 (Difficulty Adjustment)

Sec5.2.1
5.2.4(Modified
(Light Client)
Sec
2-hop)

Sec 5.2.1TwinsCoin
(Modified 2-hop)

Fig. 16.: Roadmap for blockchain design in TwinsCoin.

5.2.4

Light client design in TwinsCoin

Checking the validity of a proof-of-work block requires a constant-time operation (i.e., two SHA256 invocations); thus for a blockchain with n blocks, the time to check
the validity is linear (O(n)). In contrast, in all the proof-of-stake protocols checking a balance of a block generator is needed in order to verify the validity of blockchain. Currently,
holding the whole balance sheet is needed for the verification. However, this creates lots
of difficulty for light clients. Verification time (if a balance sheet is indexed by a public key)
for a block is about O(log S), where S is a size of the balance sheet. Once balance sheet
becomes too big to be stored in random-access memory, performance could be degraded
significantly. In Bitcoin, once block size limit is reached, size of a balance sheet (more
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precisely, unspent outputs set) is growing roughly linearly with time (a corresponding
graph could be found at [Blo17]), thus verification time for n PoS blocks is O(n · log n).
The concerns of heavy validation could be the solid arguments against switching from a
Proof-of-Work chain to the hybrid one.
As a solution, we propose to authenticate the balance sheet as 2-party dynamic authenticated (public key → balance) dictionary. In the paper [FC:RMCI17] an authenticated data structure of this kind is proposed to be used in order to avoid holding all the
state for the full nodes. We are applying the principle further in order to make light clients
feasible in a Proof-of-Stake environment.
A root value after processing the transactions in a block is to be included in a blockheader of a PoS-block. Also, a stakeholder generating a block is including an authenticating path for his output against a root of a previous PoS-block. However, verification time
for a block remains the O(log S), with O(n·log n) for a chain, but a constant factor would
be much smaller. We back the claim with an experiment provided in Section 6.2.0.2. It is
not needed to hold the whole state in order to check whether a PoS-block was generated
in a valid way, as by using a 2-party authenticated dynamic dictionary it becomes possible to check proofs and get a new root value without holding the whole dataset. As a
drawback, block size would be increased by O(log S) bytes, we provide concrete numbers
in Section 6.2.0.2.
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CHAPTER 6

IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS

We provide a full-fledged implementation of TwinsCoin. Details on the implementation
are provided in Section 6.1. We run several experiments on particular aspects of our design
in order to empirically evaluate the claims made throughout the paper and also study some
aspects of proof-of-stake difficulty readjustment function in Section 6.2. We also run fully
functional TwinsCoin nodes over a testing network which is described in Section 6.2.1.
6.1

Implementation
We implement TwinsCoin using the Scorex framework [Inp16] in Scala language.

Our implementation is full-fledged. Therefore, it is possible to run the testing network
without any code modifications. Our implementation is opensourced

1

and published

under public domain CC0 license.
There are a few open source modular blockchain development tools available, such
as Scorex [Inp16], Sawtooth Lake [Int16a], and Fabric [IBM16]. We choose to use Scorex
2.0 [Inp16] because this is the only existing tool which supports two (or more) types of
blocks.
The idea of a modular design for a cryptocurrency was first proposed by Goodman in
Tezos whitepaper [Goo]. The whitepaper (Section 2 of it) proposes to break a cryptocurrency design into three protocols: network, transaction and consensus. In many cases,
however, these layers are tightly coupled and it is hard to describe them separately. For example, in a proof-of-stake cryptocurrency a balance sheet structure, which is heavily influ1

https://bitbucket.org/TwCoin/twinscoin
107

enced by a transaction structure, is used in a consensus protocol. To split the layers clearly,
Scorex 2.0 has finer granularity. In particular, in order to support hybrid blockchains as
well as more complicated structures than a chain (such as SPECTRE[SLZ16]), Scorex 2.0
does not even have a notion of the blockchain as a core abstraction. Instead, it provides
an abstract interface to a history which contains persistent modifiers. The history is a part
of a node view, which is a quadruple of hhistory, minimal state, vault, memory pooli. The
minimal state is a data structure and a corresponding interface providing an ability to
check a validity of an arbitrary transaction for the current moment of time with the same
result for all the nodes in the network having the same history. The minimal state is to be
obtained deterministically from an inital pre-historical state and the history. The vault is
the node-specific information, for example, a node user’s wallet. The memory pool holds
unconfirmed transactions being propagated across the networks by nodes before got into
blocks.
The whole node view quadruple is to be changed atomically by applying whether a
persistent node view modifier or an unconfirmed transaction. Scorex provides guarantees
of atomicity and consistency for the application while a coin developer needs to provide
implementations for the abstract parts of the quadruple as well as a family of persistent
modifiers. Our implementation is introducing two kinds of persistent modifiers, PoWBlocks and PoS-Blocks.
Our implementation has simpler transactions than Bitcoin [Wikc]: while a TwinsCoin transaction has multiple inputs and outputs, like in Bitcoin, an output contains
only a public key of a spender and a value (so no support for Bitcoin Script [Wikb] or
another authentication language is provided). To spend an output, one needs to sign its
bytes in a referring input. In order to prevent replay attacks, we also associate an output
with an unique nonce value, which is a result of hash(all the transaction bytes without
nonces k output index in the transaction). Like in Bitcoin reference implementation, the
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minimal state in the TwinsCoin is the current unspent outputs set (UTXO [Gui] set). In
both the systems, with the UTXO set it is possible to decide whether an arbitrary transaction valid against it or not. By processing a block, a node is removing outputs spent in
the block from the set and put there newly created unspent outputs.
We also have implemented block generation functionality directly inside the node
software. Iteration over nonce space in Proof-of-Work mining component is artificially
limited in order to reduce the load of an evaluation environment and model non-flat mining networks easily. Thus, a number of hash function calls per second is to be set explicitly
in code. As in Bitcoin, a proof-of-work function is about to find a hash value with a certain
property of a block header with a nonce field included. We use Blake2b hash function with
256 bits output to have 128-bit security level. In our implementation PoW-miners start to
work on a next attempting block right after previous one seen and before corresponding
PoS-block arrives. Thus the mining component working all the time except PoS-block
processing phases.
Rollbacks are possible in a blockchain system if a better fork found. We store all the
blocks ever got from the network (Bitcoin does the same), so an implementation of the
history interface is just switching a pointer to a new best chain in case of a fork. For the
minimal state (the UTXO set) as well as for the wallet we need to restore an old version
of possibly big dataset before applying blocks from a new best chain after a common one.
To simplify previous database snapshot restoring, we are using a versioned key-value
database engine IODB [Kot]. IODB has been built to be used in blockchain systems, so
it provides batch updates only and a rollback to an arbitrary snapshot in the past within
depth to be set during database creation.
We are reusing peer-to-peer network from the Scorex without any changes. Nodes in
the network send announces about their blocks and transactions with INV messages like
in Bitcoin [Wika]. A new block is announced with the same mechanism; thus, propagation
109

time for miners is worse than in Bitcoin network where miners have direct low-latency
links to each other and push a header of a new block immediately.
Our implementation is compact, just about 2,300 lines of code, thanks to the frameworks used and concise Scala language.
6.2

Experiments
In this section, we investigate some aspects of the TwinsCoin proposal with the help

of targeted experiments. First experiment is about a competition of two chains, an honest
and an adversarial, similar to described in the original Nakamoto paper ( [Nak08], Section
11). The goal of a second experiment is to measure efficiency of the light client proposal
from the Section 5.2.4. Third experiment examines proof-of-stake difficulty readjustment
procedure in a simulated environment.
6.2.0.1

Chain race experiment

In the original Bitcoin paper [Nak08], Nakamoto evaluated his proposal by considering competition of two chains, one of an adversary and another of an honest miner
showing that the adversarial chain cannot overtake the honest one until it is backed by
majority of mining power. As there are two resources providing a possibility to generate
a block in our proposal, we simulate an adversary possessing different amounts of total
hashing power and also total stake.
In our experiment, an adversarial and an honest parties work on separate TwinsCoin
instances generating chain-pairs of length 10 (so 10 PoW-blocks and also 10 PoS-blocks).
A party which generates its chain-pair first wins the race. The honest party owns 100
outputs locking the same amount of money while the adversary has only some fraction
of that. Difficulties are static during the experiment, time to generate a PoW-block on
average is overwhelmingly big in comparison with time needed to process a block, and
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proof-of-stake difficulty is set to have about 1 output chosen on average for the honest
party. The code could be found in the file PrivateChain.scala.
The result is presented in Figure 17. We run every experiment 20 times and consider that the adversary succeeds if he wins at least once. Gray area in the figure shows
adversarial success.

Fig. 17.: Influence of attacker’s stake to his hashrate.

The results show that even with 70% of total mining power, the adversary also needs
for about 20% of total stake to generate a better chain than the honest party’s. Given
Bitcoin capitalization of $20 billion at the moment of writing, 20% of stake is about $4 billion. However, not all the stake is online so security projected into money would be about
lower level. It is hard to define precisely how much stake is online in Bitcoin, and how
much it would be in case of PoS rewards being granted for that. Also, we have observed
only the simplest kind of attack in this experiment. The adversary can do better, for example, by exploiting network-level protocol with Eclipse attacks [Hei+15]. Nevertheless,
a malicious miner needs to spend a lot of money to overtake the honest parties.

111

6.2.0.2

Light validation experiment

We estimate practically how efficient is the light validation procedure proposed in
the Section 5.2.4. For that, we compare two chain validators. A full validator is operating
with full state residing in a persistent key-value database. A light validator is checking
lookup proofs from blockheaders. Both validators are performing lookup operations only.
For the experiment, we use authenticated AVL+ trees from [Rey+16]. The full validator code is using disk-based database MvStore with 128 MB in-memory LRU cache.
The experiment is started with a balance sheet of about 46 million (public key → balance)
pairs (where a public key is about 32 bytes, a value is about 8 bytes). We then try bigger
sheets, up to 92 million pairs in size. Thus the testing dataset starts from a size like Bitcoin
UTXO set of today [Blo17] and finishes with twice of that size. We use a machine with i7
processor, 16 GB RAM and HDD disk (5400 RPM) for the experiment.

Fig. 18.: Balance lookup time.

Figure 18 shows running times for both the validators. The results show that our
light validator is running in effective constant time negligible to the running time of the
full validator (the running time of the light validator is about 20-25 microseconds per
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operation).
For the light validator, a proof of a block generator’s balance is to be included into a
block. We obtain proof sizes for different sizes of balance sheet, they are provided in the
Figure 19. The proof size for a Bitcoin-like balance sheet size (46M elements) is about 960
bytes and remains no more than kilobyte when balance sheet is about 92M elements.

Fig. 19.: Balance lookup proof size.

6.2.0.3

Proof-of-stake difficulty experiments

In the Proof-of-Stake difficulty readjustment formula (see Formula 5.2) we use the V
parameter to show the probability that a PoW-block is a successful block. In other words,
V indicates the probability that a PoW-block is successfully mapped to a stakeholder. Also,
1 − V value shows how many attempting blocks an average successful proof-of-work
block has included. However, in a distributed environment, real values could be different
from the planned ones because of propagation effects. To know the difference we made an
experiment where proof-of-stake block was sent to proof-of-work miner not immediately
but with a random delay distributed uniformly from 0 to 5% of target generation time. We
measure number of attempting blocks included into a successful blocks. Results provided
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in the Figure 20 show that in this scenario experimental numbers are close to the planned
ones.

Fig. 20.: Percentage of Attempting Blocks

We found that, given a constant stake, target value is changing with number of stakeholders growing. The dependency is presented in the Figure 21.

Fig. 21.: T̃ Value
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6.2.1

Testnet

We launch TwinsCoin full-fledged implementation over a publicly accessible testing
network (so-called “testnet” in cryptocurrency jargon). For that, we deploy TwinsCoin to
tens of machines, including AWS (Amazon) instances in the US, Europe, Asia, as well as
physical machines in Germany and Russia. Each node in the network is connected to 10
random neighbors. Every machine is participating in proof-of-work blocks mining, few
machines have public keys with stake on-board so generating proof-of-stake blocks also.
Target time between proof-of-work blocks is 10 minutes and V = 0.8.
User interface. Scorex generates a user interface (UI) automatically and few requests
regarding common functionality are available with no any efforts needed. In order to
add specific functionality, a coin developer needs to specify handlers for the additional
requests. The interface is available in a web browser. With the help of the UI, a TwinsCoin
user is able to see the hybrid blockchain contents, network peers and their statuses, wallet
public keys and corresponding balances. It is also possible to create a transaction (to send
tokens) via the user interface.
Monetary policy and incentives. The currency in the network has no emission, so
all the coins are issued in the initial state. Proof-of-Stake block generators are getting
transaction fees as rewards while Proof-of-Work miners are getting nothing (as finding a
proper incentives structure is left for further research).
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Appendix A

ABBREVIATIONS

VCU

Virginia Commonwealth University

RVA

Richmond Virginia

PoW

Proof-of-work

PoS

Proof-of-stake
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